The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

against remotely controlled IEDs, which had been on order for “some time” and were

now urgent.

313. IED counter‑measures are described in more detail in Section 14.1.

314. On 27 May, Mr Stuart Jack, Mr Parham’s successor as Head of the IOU, advised

Mr Straw:

“… we are currently at the limit of technical measures we can apply to protect

staff in Iraq. They have armoured cars and armed protection … All staff have body

armour and helmets. Everyone in Baghdad now sleeps under hard cover … security

managers are constantly reviewing the threat and apply the security guidelines

robustly; if travel becomes too dangerous, staff are required to remain in the

secure zone. It would be difficult to do much more and still allow staff to carry out

their jobs.” 214

315. Mr Jack identified three options for “further minimising” risk to staff:

“(i) We could bring forward departure dates for those staff scheduled to leave

in June, as DFID are planning.

(ii) We could delay the deployment of new staff going out to fill jobs at the

Embassy.

( iii) We could reduce our presence in Baghdad.”

316. FCO security advisers visited Baghdad and Basra again from 14 to 20 June.

Mr Millett reported that the threat was higher than on the advisers’ previous five visits.

Security within the secure zones was good, but transport security remained the main

problem.215 He stated:

“We have now reached the limit of what we can do to protect staff in Iraq …

[I]f the numbers of attacks increase further, we have nowhere else to go …

“We must ensure the numbers of staff are kept as low as possible consistent with

achieving our strategic objectives in Iraq. We also have to ensure that we keep

the contingency plan up‑to‑date for evacuation by the US and/or UK military.”

317. Mr Richmond reported on 17 June that the threat to staff in Baghdad was at its

highest level since April 2003.216 Journeys outside the Green Zone were only being

approved under exceptional circumstances, seriously handicapping operational capacity

(although work to support the Prime Minister’s Office and some other programmes were

continuing). He had asked all staff who were not staying beyond 30 June to leave by

21 June.

214 Minute Jack to PS [FCO], 27 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Civilian Staffing and Security’.

215 Minute Millett to Buck, 25 June 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.

216 Telegram 328 IraqRep to FCO London, 17 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Security of Personnel’.

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