The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Since most
of the US work is going on in the Pentagon, a key opportunity
to
influence
the Americans will be the Defence Secretary’s talks with Rumsfeld
in
Washington
on 12 February. A brief setting out the best points in favour of
the UK’s
model is
being co-ordinated in the Cabinet Office, and will be served up to
Mr Hoon,
and also to
the Foreign Secretary and David Manning, for use later in the week
with
Powell and
Rice.
“This is a
key issue with huge resource implications. Now is our moment
of
maximum
leverage on the Americans, and I think it should be a high priority
for
discussions
with them over the next fortnight. It may be an issue to be taken
up by
the PM with
Bush before US thinking sets in concrete.”
226.
Mr Ricketts
also informed Mr Straw that there was inter-departmental
agreement
that “the
FCO should lead policy work on planning for post-conflict Iraq”.
The first task
of the new
Iraq Planning Unit (IPU) would be “to start assembling answers to
the many
questions
thrown up by PJHQ as they begin to plan for coping with the
situation military
forces will
find in Iraq as soon as conflict finishes”.110
227.
Mr Straw
commented: “Good note … I need to talk to [Secretary] Powell re
this.”111
228.
The
inter-departmental (FCO/MOD/DFID) Iraq Planning Unit (IPU), based
in
the FCO,
was established on 10 February to improve Whitehall co-ordination
on
post-conflict
issues.
229.
Although
the IPU was an inter-departmental unit, its head was a
senior
member of
the Diplomatic Service and it was integrated into the FCO
management
structure.
230.
The draft
Terms of Reference for the IPU stated that:
•
The IPU
would report to Mr Chaplin in the FCO. The Terms of
Reference
did not
define the relationship between the IPU and senior officials in
DFID
and the
MOD.
•
The IPU
would work “within broad policy guidelines set by the
Cabinet
Office”.
•
The main
purpose of the IPU would be to provide “policy guidance on
the
practical
questions” that UK civilian officials and military
commanders
would face
in Iraq.
•
The IPU was
intended “to bring influence to bear on US plans”.
110
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Strategy’.
111
Manuscript
comment Straw on Minute Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 7
February 2003,
‘Iraq Strategy’.
350