Previous page | Contents | Next page
5  |  Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003
344.  Mr Wood had warned Mr Straw on 24 January that “without a further decision
by the Council, and absent extraordinary circumstances”, the UK would not be
able lawfully to use force against Iraq.
345.  Mr Wood wrote to Mr Straw on 22 and 24 January about the terms of the
discussions on a second resolution.
346.  Commenting on advice to Mr Straw for his visit to Washington, Mr Wood wrote:
“The Foreign Secretary will know that the legal advice is that a second resolution
authorising the use of force is needed before any force may lawfully be employed
against Iraq to enforce the WMD obligations in the SCRs. If a draft resolution fails
because of a veto (or indeed because it does not receive nine positive votes), the
fact that the veto (or failure to vote in favour) is ‘unreasonable’ is neither here nor
there from a legal point of view. Further, who is to judge what is ‘unreasonable’?”132
347.  In his second minute, Mr Wood expressed concern about Mr Straw’s reported
remarks to Vice President Cheney.133
348.  Mr Wood wrote that Kosovo was “no precedent”: the legal basis was the need to
avert an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe; no draft resolution had been put to the
Security Council; and no draft had been vetoed. He hoped there was:
“… no doubt in anyone’s mind that without a further decision of the Council, and
absent extraordinary circumstances (of which at present there is no sign), the United
Kingdom cannot lawfully use force against Iraq to ensure compliance with its SCR
WMD obligations. To use force without Security Council authority would amount to
the crime of aggression.”
349.  Mr Straw told Mr Wood he did not accept that view and that there was a
strong case for a different view.
350.  Mr Straw discussed the advice with Mr Wood on 28 January.134
351.  Mr Straw wrote to Mr Wood the following day: “I note your advice, but I do not
accept it.”135
352.  Quoting his experiences as Home Secretary, Mr Straw stated that, “even on
apparently open and shut issues”, he had been advised: “there could be a different view,
honestly and reasonably held. And so it turned out to be time and again.”
132 Minute Wood to PS [FCO], 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal Position’.
133 Minute Wood to PS [FCO], 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force’.
134 Manuscript comment McDonald to Wood, 28 January 2003, on Minute Wood to PS [FCO],
24 January 2002, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force’.
135 Minute Straw to Wood, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal Basis for Use of Force’.
65
Previous page | Contents | Next page