10.3 |
Reconstruction: oil, commercial interests, debt relief, asylum and
stabilisation policy
72.
The paper
stated that there were many possible permutations of the “stable
united
and law
abiding [Iraqi] state … providing effective and representative
government”
sought by
the UK, but focused on two:
•
“Iraq under
a new, more amenable strongman”, after Saddam Hussein had
been
toppled
prior to or in the early stages of any military campaign;
and
•
“a more
representative and democratic Iraq” after Saddam Hussein’s regime
had
collapsed
following a military campaign.
73.
In the second
scenario, the UK’s “preferred model” comprised three
phases:
•
A
transitional military administration (which could last up to six
months).
Priorities
would include maintaining a version of the OFF programme
and
planning
for the revival of Iraq’s economy.
•
A UN
administration (which might administer Iraq for approximately three
years,
while a
Constitution was agreed). Priorities would be to repair “war
damage”
to Iraq’s
oil industry and introduce new investment. Some way would have
to
be found to
reconcile payment of Iraq’s huge external debt and
compensation
claims with
its reconstruction and development needs.
•
A sovereign
Iraqi Government.
74.
The paper did
not address what role, if any, the UK might have in pursuing
those
priorities.
75.
A Treasury
paper on the impact of conflict on the global economy and the UK
was
circulated
to the AHGI on 7 November.33
The
Treasury’s assessment of the impact on
the global
economy remained unchanged from 6 September.
76.
Mr Edward
Chaplin, FCO Director Middle East and North Africa, led the
UK
delegation
to the first round of talks on post-conflict issues with a US
inter-agency team
and an
Australian delegation in Washington on 6 November.34
77.
Mr Drummond,
a member of the UK delegation, reported to Sir David Manning
on
8 November
that the US wanted to establish a trust fund for Iraqi oil
revenues, under
Coalition
control, which would be transparent and enable resources to be used
for the
benefit of
the Iraqi people.35
78.
There are no
indications that the UK engaged with the US on that issue until
the
second
round of US/UK/Australia talks, in late January 2003.
33
Letter Dodd
to Ad Hoc Group on Iraq, 7 November 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’
attaching Paper
Treasury,
October 2002, ‘Economic Impact of a War in Iraq’.
34
Telegram
1456 Washington to FCO London, 7 November 2002, ‘Iraq: UK/US
Consultations on Day After
Issues: 6
November 2002’.
35
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 8 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
385