3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
298.
SIS4 stated
that Sir David Manning had asked for:
“A quick
paper … of key issues that we need to bear in mind to keep our
balance
and our
perspective in considering Iraq as a rapidly expanding threat … A
sort of
299.
SIS4 stated
that the first paper was trying to bring out the hazards about
the
experience
to date with Iraq if direct action were taken.143
300.
SIS4 stated
that he had been concerned about:
“… the lack
of our response to the re-emergence of Iraq as a serious
regional
power …
“I was very
alarmed at the way that Iraq was eroding the sanctions regime
and
evading it.
It had been successful in seeing us off with propaganda since the
end
of the
first Gulf War …
“… that
power and vitality of Iraq were, in my view, a real threat to the
stability of
301.
Citing the
impact of Iraqi chemical attacks on Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq
War,
SIS4 added
that “Iraq’s potential, its capability in the WMD field, was very
dramatic”:
“So the
idea of putting an end to this problem was not something I would
advocate,
but I would
see the force of the desire to do it to be
decisive.”145
302.
Sir Richard
Dearlove could not “recall the exact details” that led to the
request
for SIS
advice, but he recalled “the circumstances”, which he described as
“a sort of
dearth of
expertise in the Foreign Office at that sort of level of
sophistication, and I’m
pretty sure
that this initiative comes out of me, David [Manning] and [SIS4]
talking
303.
Sir Richard
described the papers as “catalysts” to stimulate thinking;
and
emphasised
that they had “no status as official papers at all”.
304.
Sir David
Manning was unable to recall the circumstances in which he
had
requested
advice from SIS4 on 30 November, although he postulated that it
was
a reflection
of SIS4’s expertise.147
305.
Sir David
pointed out that the discussion of regime change at that stage was
about
fomenting
regime change within Iraq, not about an invasion.
142
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 6.
143
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 6.
144
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 12.
145
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 13.
146
Private
hearing, 16 June 2010, pages 9-11.
147
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 9-16.
363