9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
maintaining
a higher level of commitment for longer, with all that this would
mean
in terms
of cost and for the long-term health of the Armed
Forces.”
24.
On 25 March,
the FCO in London received a report from Sir Jeremy
Greenstock,
UK
Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, of a conversation
with Mr Kofi
Annan,
Secretary-General of the UN.14
Mr Annan
was due to meet Dr Condoleezza Rice,
President
Bush’s National Security Advisor, that day.
25.
Sir Jeremy
said that he “assumed that the UN would not want to run Iraq nor
its
security
sector”. Mr Annan told him that “Coalition respect for Iraqi
sovereignty, territorial
integrity
and political independence would be a precondition for a UN role”
and that he
“would not
wish to see any arrangement subjugating UN activity to Coalition
activity”.
26.
After meeting
Mr Annan, Sir Jeremy spoke to Ambassador John Negroponte,
US
Permanent
Representative to the UN, who observed that the focus within the
Security
Council on
“no legitimisation of Coalition military action” might make it
impossible to
secure its
authorisation. Sir Jeremy reminded him that without a resolution
there would
be no IFI
or other international funding for reconstruction and it would be
“hard to drum
up troop
contributors to permit an exit strategy for US/UK
forces”.
27.
Mr Desmond
Bowen, Deputy Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat,
sent a draft paper setting out ‘British Post-Conflict Objectives’
to the FCO,
the MOD,
DFID and the Cabinet Office on 25 March.15
28.
Mr Bowen
suggested that officials should show the draft paper to their
Ministers,
if they
had not already done so:
“We will
then see the outcome of the Prime Ministerial visit to Camp David
and
consider
formal submission early next week.”
29.
The paper on
objectives stated:
“We have
made plans with our international partners to assist the Iraqi
people
in the process
of transition. With others, we will assist in the return to full
Iraqi
sovereignty
by:
•
seeking a
UN mandate for the international community’s continued
presence
in
Iraq;
•
working to
establish an Iraqi Interim Authority, mandated and facilitated by
the
UN, and
supported by the coalition and the international community;
and
•
indicating
a pathway to the restoration of a sovereign, accountable
and
representative
Iraqi government and facilitating a political process, with
UN
14
Telegram
526 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq Phase IV: UN
Dynamics’.
15
Letter
Bowen to Chaplin, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Post Conflict Objectives’
attaching Paper, 25 March
2003,
‘Iraq: British Post-Conflict Objectives’.
135