9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
“… a
growing weight of evidence suggesting that … [Abu Musab] al-
Zarqawi, who
has a
longstanding relationship with AI, is beginning to play a leading
role in co-
ordinating
the activities of some mujahedin groups. Indications that AI,
al- Zarqawi
and
possibly AQ are co-ordinating activity and consolidating their
presence
represent a
worrying development … We remain unclear as to the capabilities
of
these
various Islamist extremist groups and cannot link them to specific
attacks.
However,
reporting shows that they continue to plan and conduct attacks,
including
suicide
bombings, and could pose an increasing threat to Coalition
interests. There
is
reporting that Islamist extremists regard the capture of Saddam
Hussein as
providing
an ideological vacuum that can be exploited in Sunni
areas.”
669.
In January,
the UK was keen to persuade the UN to become more involved in
the
political
process, although the UN was initially minded not to engage on the
ground until
after the
handover to Iraqi sovereignty on 1 July.369
670.
The UK hoped
that the UN would decide that direct elections to the
Transitional
National
Assembly were not possible, and would confirm this to Grand
Ayatollah
al-Sistani,
which would assist him in withdrawing his objections to the
caucus
arrangements.
671.
The UK also
hoped that the UN could become involved by at least observing
the
caucus
elections. UK officials noted that, having sought to exclude the
UN, the US now
saw UN
involvement in organising the caucus elections and drafting the TAL
as a way
out of
their problems.
672.
UK officials
considered that, given Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s resistance,
they
needed to
have a fall-back position. The US, and UK Ministers, remained
wedded to a
transition
on 30 June. An alternative to caucus elections, although less
legitimate, would
be to use
the GC to select TNA members from the Governorates.
673.
A statement
issued by the office of Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani on 11
January
said that
he had explained to the President of the GC his continued
objections to the
15 November
process, and their consequences, including:
“… if the
provisional national council was formed on the basis of a
mechanism
that did
not enjoy the necessary legitimacy, it would not be able and
neither would
the
government emanating from it be able, to carry out their tasks and
honour the
timetable
set for the transitional period. Consequently, this would create
serious
problems
and the politicial and security situation would further
exacerabate.”370
369
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 12 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.
370
Talmon
S. The
Occupation of Iraq: Volume II The Official Documents of the
Coalition Provisional
Authority and
the Iraqi Governing Council. Hart
Publishing, 2013.
317