The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Sir Andrew Turnbull (Cabinet Secretary), Mr Powell, Mr Campbell, Baroness Morgan

(Mr Blair’s Director of Political and Government Relations), Sir David Manning and

Mr Rycroft were also present.

164. Mr Blair had already had a bilateral discussion with Lord Goldsmith on 11 March

on the legal basis for the use of military force early. That is addressed in Section 5.

165. Mr Straw’s Private Office wrote to No.10 on 11 March, reporting that the US

was pressing for a response “as soon as possible” to the letter delivered by the US

Ambassador to London to Mr Straw on 5 March.48 That had formally requested the

British Government’s agreement to the use of RAF Fairford, Diego Garcia and, possibly,

other British bases for military operations against Iraq.

166. The FCO advised that “under international law, the UK would be responsible

for any US action in breach of international law in which the UK knowingly assisted”.

The draft response was “premised on a decision that UNSCR [UN Security Council

resolution] 1441 and other relevant resolutions” provided “the authority for action”.

167. A minute from Mr Desmond Bowen, the Deputy Head of OD Sec, advised Sir David

Manning that the request was to be discussed at Mr Blair’s meeting with Lord Goldsmith,

Mr Straw and Mr Hoon on 11 March.49 He understood that Mr Straw and Mr Hoon had

copies of Lord Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March.

168. The briefing note for Mr Blair described confirmation of the viability of the overall

military plan as the “main purpose of the meeting”.50

169. The record of the meeting on 11 March stated that Mr Blair had started by

addressing the legal base for military action.51 He stated that Lord Goldsmith’s “advice

made it clear that a reasonable case could be made” that resolution 1441 was “capable

of reviving” the authorisation of resolution 678, “although of course a second resolution

would be preferable”.

170. Other points recorded by Mr Rycroft included:

• Adm Boyce said he “would need to put a short paragraph [on the legal basis]

in his directive to members of the Armed Forces”.

• That “should be cleared with the Attorney General”.

• The UK would send the US a positive reply on its request to use Diego Garcia

and RAF Fairford “in a day or two, with the usual conditions attached”.

• Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce advised that “once we had given our approval, the US

might give very little notice before the start of the campaign”.

48 Letter Sinclair to Rycroft, 11 March 2003, ‘US Request to use Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford for

Possible Operations Against Iraq’.

49 Minute Bowen to Manning, 11 March 2003, ‘US use of British Bases’.

50 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military: 1300 Meeting’.

51 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Legal and Military Aspects’.

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