9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
32.
Lt Gen Cooper
reported that it was not clear to what extent the Special Groups
had
bought into
the deal.
33.
On 12 May,
Mr Browne wrote to Mr Brown to report his visit to Basra
the previous
week.9
He agreed
with the assessment in Mr Miliband’s letter of 29 April (see
Section 9.6)
that the
Charge of the Knights had “created the platform for transition we
were hoping
for from
General Mohan’s operations later in the year”.
34.
To capitalise
on the opportunity presented, Mr Browne considered that the UK
must:
•
help ensure
that the “still fragile” security on the ground in Basra
continued
to improve;
•
finalise
agreement with the US over the division of military effort in
MND(SE)
over the
next six months; and
•
“agree a
narrative of what happened and why, and get it into circulation
quickly –
not only
here but in the US, where our reputation is undoubtedly
tarnished”.
35.
The medium
term was “more complicated”. Military advice was that it
would
be
difficult to fulfil the commitments agreed with the US – in
particular mentoring
14 Division
– while also making significant force level reductions before
November.
While
Mr Browne agreed with Mr Miliband that the UK should aim
to transfer the two-star
command
sooner rather than later:
“Our
discussions so far with General Petraeus will have engendered a
US
assumption
that we have agreed to retain command of MND(SE) at least for
the
next six
months.”
“The key
question implied by David [Miliband] is whether we intend to leave
Basra
this year,
by mid 2009 or by the end of next year. We have prepared
Washington
for a
significant further troop reduction after their elections but not,
explicitly, for
withdrawal
… we have the opportunity to be out by May 2009 … if we are
prepared
to inform
the President elect of our decision in November. Alternatively, we
could
negotiate
an exit with the new Administration and … be out at the end of
2009. Both
risk
compromising our relations with the incoming President but the
former runs less
chance of
our being entangled in longer term commitments …”
37.
Mr Browne’s
letter concluded by mentioning the need to resolve the future
legal
status of
UK forces in Iraq after resolution 1790 (2007) expired, something
about which
he
“remained concerned”. This had a direct bearing on the question of
troop numbers
9
Letter
Browne to Brown, 12 May 2007 [sic], ‘Iraq’.
387