The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
757.
Overall, the
JIC judged:
“I.
Violence in Basra is increasingly focussed on the Multi-National
Forces (MNF).
Jaysh
al‑Mahdi (JAM) associated ‘secret cells’ believe their campaign has
driven
the MNF
out: they will try to maintain momentum until the MNF withdraw from
the
province
altogether. Attacks on the residual presence – particularly at
Basra Air
Station –
will intensify. The JAM networks are resilient: MNF pressure is
likely to
have only
temporary success in disrupting their activities.
“II. Most
political parties in Basra see Provincial Iraqi Control as an
opportunity to
extend
their power base. As the scale of MNF presence reduces, violence
between
rival Shia
parties, backed by their militias, is likely to intensify.
Provincial elections
will be a
catalyst.”
758.
The JIC
concluded that political events would have a decisive
impact:
“III. The
nature and scale of any intra‑Shia conflict will be determined by
events
in Baghdad
and Najaf, particularly the ability of the United Iraqi Alliance to
stick
together
and assert authority over its provincial supporters. In the absence
of an
effective
political brake on serious intra‑Shia fighting, the Iraqi security
forces would
not be able
to cope; the police would probably fragment and the army would try
to
avoid
direct confrontation, while seeking to contain the
situation.
…
“VI. Iran
will continue to provide training and weaponry to Shia extremists,
mainly
JAM,
attacking the MNF, with the aim of speeding MNF withdrawal from the
south
and making
its life as difficult as possible so long as it
remains.”
759.
The JIC judged
that reported levels of recorded violence in MND(SE)
had
increased
since it last considered the issue in September 2006, and accounted
for
around 5
percent of the national total. The vast majority of the violence
occurred in
Basra
province and consisted of attacks on the MNF by Shia militia,
particularly JAM.
760.
In Basra, the
JIC assessed that Op SINBAD had had “some local effect
in
disrupting
military activity and improving public confidence” and there was
reported to
have been a
decrease in the number of sectarian and other murders. Politically,
JAM
was
becoming more assertive and willing to use violence to gain
advantage.
761.
The JIC judged
that Muthanna and Dhi Qar provinces were “likely to remain
mostly
stable”,
with Muthanna “one of the most stable provinces in Iraq” where the
Provincial
Reconstruction
Team (PRT) was able to operate with little
interference.
762.
In Dhi Qar,
the JIC judged that JAM “secret cells” were becoming more
active
and there
were already some no‑go areas for the ISF in JAM‑controlled
districts of the
provincial
capital. Maysan was considered “more volatile” with “low level
intra‑Shia
violence …
bubbling just under the surface”.
142