9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
paper
needed to say more about Iraqi views on whether the UK should
remain and to
include a
more nuanced section on US views.398
819.
On the same
day, the Chiefs of Staff were told by Lt Gen Houghton
that:
“The
increase in attacks in MND(SE), together with the uncertain future
intelligence
picture
meant that it might not be possible to make bold decisions with
reference
to
operational transition in Iraq. It was felt that some troop
reductions would be
justifiable
in terms of risk in order to demonstrate further progress and to
ensure
the ISF
continued to take increasing responsibility for security in
MND(SE). Any
future
troop reductions would have complex presentational aspects for UK …
The
recommendations
for future UK troop numbers in Iraq would be forwarded to
COS
820.
Lt Gen
Houghton told the Chiefs of Staff that Prime Minister Maliki had
become
increasingly
concerned about General Mohan’s “accommodations” with JAM
elements
in Basra.
From a UK perspective, Lt Gen Houghton hoped that Gen Mohan would
not
be
transferred from Basra, where he was “a known quantity” and was
understood to be
making use
of the extended JAM freeze to isolate and eliminate the JAM Special
Groups
and
splinter groups.
821.
At PJHQ’s
request, on 27 February the JIC examined the prospects for
security,
political,
and economic stability across southern Iraq during
2008.400
Its Key
Judgements
were:
“I.
Mutually reinforcing factors are helping to keep attacks against
the Multi-National
Forces
(MNF) in MND(SE) at a low level [JAM1] remains active in
preserving
a
cease-fire – though his influence may be reducing. Work by Basra’s
Security
Co‑ordinator
and Provincial Director of Police, and the continuation of
Muqtada
al‑Sadr’s
‘freeze’ on JAM activity are also key. The situation is fragile and
could
quickly
deteriorate.
“II. Iran’s
attitude to anti-MNF-violence in Iraq is linked to its wider
national agenda,
particularly
its relationship with the US. A more aggressive US posture in the
South
might
prompt the IRGC QF to sponsor more anti-MNF attacks in response.
Iran will
continue
its efforts to build political and economic influence and defuse
intra-Shia
rivalries
in southern Iraq, driven by a desire to ensure that its influence
pervades
Shia
politics more widely.
“III.
Intra-Shia clashes will intensify as provincial elections approach.
Assassinations
of
politicians and violent intimidation of the electorate are likely.
In the worst case,
398
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 27 February 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Paper Meeting,
26 February’.
399
Minutes, 26
February 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
400
JIC
Assessment, 27 February 2008, ‘Iraq: Security Prospects in the
South’.
333