14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)

1074.  Gen Granville‑Chapman responded on 7 September.567 He wrote that it was

worth recognising that the UK was operating above concurrency levels “(which did

not envisage two medium scale enduring operations over extended LOCs [Lines of

Communication] and did not plan for a helicopter fleet to match)”. He also stated that

the MOD had “postponed rectifying the acknowledged 15‑20 percent helicopter shortfall

until at least 2010” when it had taken £1.5bn of savings against the Future Rotorcraft

Capability (FRC) programme in 2004.

1075.  Gen Granville‑Chapman wrote that Lt Gen Houghton’s “current battlefield

helicopter requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan” were being met by the deployment

of additional aircraft and the resourcing of additional flying hours in both theatres.

That increased level of activity was, “on the face of it, sustainable” and the requirement

had been confirmed by the recent Force Level Review.

1076.  In Iraq, there was little potential for reducing the “aviation bill” in the short term.

1077.  The nature of both campaigns required a “critical theatre entry standard” to

be imposed, principally the fitting of DAS and long‑range secure communications.

That meant, even with UORs to date, 65 percent of the battlefield helicopter fleet was

“not deployable”. Planned UORs would reduce that figure to 40 percent.

1078.  Gen Granville‑Chapman stated that flying hours were limited by the availability

of trained crews as much as airframes. The demand was being met by “redistributing

airframes and sweating the assets to the maximum degree” but, he warned:

“There is not likely to be any let‑up in BH tempo for at least the next five years which

leaves us with virtually no capacity to meet increased or new demands and a real

‘harmony’ problem for our BH people.”

1079.  Four options to add capability were considered:

• Leasing – an option with “limited mileage” because the resolution of indemnity

and financing issues, coupled with delivery timescales meant that significant

new deployable capability would take at least a year but more likely three.

Leased civilian helicopters in the UK could be used for training but would not

generate competent crews for operations.

• Contracting – using contractor aircraft flown by civilians was an option but the

aircraft were not “DAS’d to our standards”.

• Further developments to the existing fleet – Puma was scheduled to go out of

service in 2010 and Sea King Mk4 in 2012. To keep both models going beyond

those dates would cost £155m. Options were being considered to make some

Merlin Mk1s “dual capable as BH” and to make other aircraft into “a basic SH”.

567  Minute VCDS to SofS, 7 September 2006, ‘Helicopter Capability’.

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