1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
300.
Mr Blair
indicated his agreement on both points.158
301.
Resolution
1352, adopted on 1 June, extended the period for negotiation
by
a month
with the “intention to consider new arrangements for the sale or
supply of
commodities
and products to Iraq … in civilian sectors” while improving “the
controls to
prevent the
sale or supply of items prohibited or unauthorised by the
Council”.159
302.
After the
General Election of 7 June 2001, Mr Jack Straw was appointed as
the
Foreign
Secretary. Mr Straw told the Inquiry that Iraq was one of the
issues flagged
up in his
initial briefing, but very much as “work in
progress”.160
He was
briefed on the
problems
with existing sanctions, on the negotiations already under way to
introduce
“smarter
sanctions”, and on the question of what to do about the
NFZs.
303.
Mr Straw was
briefed on progress on Iraq for a Cabinet meeting on 28
June.161
304.
There was no
discussion in Cabinet on this or any other aspect of Iraq
policy
during
2001.
305.
Negotiations
on the “Smart Sanctions” resolution, incorporating a revised
Goods
Review List
(GRL), resumed in New York. The UK tabled a revised draft on 8
June.162
306.
It proved
impossible to achieve agreement within the Security Council on a
new
resolution.
In his statement to the Inquiry, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote:
“Russia in
particular was virulently opposed to the recasting of the sanctions
regime
lists, more
because they were trying to bring the whole sanctions regime to an
end,
as they
believed it was no longer justified, than because they disagreed
with the
idea of
focusing on ‘dual-use’ items … when this came to a head in June and
July,
the
Russians remained adamant and nothing new was
achieved.
“… the
French, who often sided with the Russians on Iraq, were quite
constructive
in their
support for these revisions, with the French Government telling us
at a very
senior
level that they believed that Saddam Hussein was continuing to
develop
his
chemical and biological capabilities (end-June 2001). France and
China told
the US and
the UK at that time that they could agree on the new Goods
Review
List. This
isolated Russia, but Moscow remained defiant. The US, in
frustration,
began to
sound increasingly belligerent about using the No-Fly Zones to
deliver
sharper
attacks on Iraqi military installations. The UK, alongside the US,
sought to
address the
Russian opposition with rational argument about the benefits to the
Iraqi
people of a
narrower list and about the good sense of concentrating on
dangerous
weaponry.
But the Russians, who were in close consultation with the
Iraqis
158
Manuscript
comment Blair on Note Sawers to Prime Minister, [undated],
[untitled].
159
UN Security
Council Resolution 1352 (2001).
160
Public
hearing, 21 January 2010, pages 4-5.
161
Minute
Stephens to Herrigan, 27 June 2001, ‘Iraq: Briefing for Cabinet
Meeting, 28 June’.
162
Minute
McKane to Sawers, 12 June 2001, ‘Iraq’.
249