14.1 | Military equipment (post-conflict)

In March 2011, the MOD told the Inquiry:

“Had SABR [Support Amphibious Battlefield Helicopter programme] continued, the

earliest delivery of new Chinooks would have been after the end of UK operations

in Iraq, so the Department does not assess that the removal of £1.4 billion from the

helicopter programme affected the availability of support helicopters for operations

in Iraq.”702

1326. The Inquiry was told that the Treasury was not an obstruction in the UOR process

but there were difficulties with the flexibility of the MOD’s budget.

1327. Mr Ingram told the Inquiry:

“… everything had to be finely justified and there was constant tussles with the

Treasury in all of that as to whether it was a UOR or whether it should come from

core expenditure …”703

1328. Lt Gen Fulton told the Inquiry this process was one whereby “we had to try to find

the money ourselves and if we couldn’t find the money then we went to the Treasury for

UORs once Iraq had started”.704

1329. Lt Gen Figgures described a process of rigorous scrutiny of requirements which

involved “some tough negotiation”.705 He told the Inquiry:

“We were given considerable sums of money over the period of time that I filled my

appointment to make that case. Whether it was helicopters or protective mobility,

defensive aid suites, all of those where we made the case were funded, but it was –

they were very rigorous in their scrutiny of the case we put forward, and you could

as a taxpayer say, well, yes, they should be. As a soldier it was hard work producing

the evidence to get past that scrutiny.”706

1330. Lt Gen Figgures added:

“When it came to the urgent operational requirements, if we could identify

requirement, justify it, have a reasonable idea of what it might cost, deliver it in

an acceptable time‑frame, then the Treasury would give us the money for it …”

1331. Asked whether he had sufficient resources to fund the equipment he thought

was relevant to operations in Iraq, Lt Gen Fulton told the Inquiry that the starting point

was that The Strategic Defence Review was not properly funded to deliver what it was

supposed to.707 That meant that the MOD was left with “an equipment capability that

existed within but did not fill the defence planning requirement”.

702 Paper [MOD], 1 March 2011, ‘Request for Evidence, Support Helicopters’.

703 Public hearing, 16 July 2010, page 29.

704 Public hearing, 27 July 2010, page 25.

705 Public hearing, 27 July 2010, page 27.

706 Public hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 23‑26.

707 Public hearing, 27 July 2010, pages 19‑20.

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