The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“I hope
that even now those countries that are saying they would use their
veto no
matter what
the circumstances will reconsider and realise that by doing so they
put
at risk not
just the disarmament of Saddam, but the unity of the United
Nations.”
301.
Mr Duncan
Smith also asked, in the light of Ms Short’s comments on 9
March,
whether the
doctrine of Cabinet responsibility applied to the option of
committing British
forces
without a second resolution. Mr Blair replied: “Yes of course
it does.”
302.
In response to
a question from Mr Elfyn Llwyd (Plaid Cymru), about whether
the
House of
Commons would have a vote on whether to commit troops,
Mr Blair replied
that it
was:
“… subject
to the security and safety of our troops … it is right that this
House has a
say on this
issue. People will then be able to see the stand that we take, and
people
will then
have to make up their minds as to the stand that they
take.”
303.
In response to
a question from Mr James Gray (Conservative) asking if
Mr Blair
felt he
needed the support of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the House of
Commons
and the
country as a whole, as well as the majority support he commanded in
Cabinet,
before
committing the UK to war, Mr Blair replied that as well as a
vote in the House of
Commons it
was:
“…
important that I set out, as Prime Minister, what I believe to be
right in this
country’s
national interest. I have tried to do that over the past few months
…”
304.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock suggested early on the afternoon of 12 March that in
the
Security
Council that day the UK should:
•
table a
revised draft resolution explaining that the UK was “setting aside
the
ultimatum
concept” in operative paragraph 3 of the draft of 7 March
“because
it had
not attracted Council support”;
•
distribute
the side statement with tests for Saddam Hussein, “explaining that
the
text was a
national position to which the UK wanted as many Council
Members
as possible
to adhere to maintain the pressure on Saddam”; and
•
state that
the 17 March date was “being reviewed”.103
305.
Sir Jeremy
favoured using the open debate in the Security Council later that
day to
explain the
UK move, adding: “At no point will I signal, in public or in
private, that there is
any UK
fallback from putting this new text to a vote within 24-36
hours.”
103
Telegram
419 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Second
Resolution’.
452