10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
would not
prove sufficiently flexible or responsive, although there were no
realistic
options
until the IFIs and World Bank engaged. Much of ORHA’s funding had
to come
through a
US bureaucratic process which even senior members of the US
Administration
described
as “frustratingly slow”.
“It is in
the UK’s self-interest (quite aside from, although coincident with,
the interests
of the
Iraqis) that rehabilitation and reconstruction proceed smoothly and
rapidly.
Without
rapid and visible rehabilitation and reconstruction it is possible
that there
will be an
erosion of the consent to the presence of the Coalition Forces.
This is a
particular
concern to 1(UK) Div as reconstruction is off to a slow start
…
…
“There is
thus a near-term gap in the provision of rehabilitation and
reconstruction
assistance
to Iraq. Inasmuch as the UK is responsible for the Lower South
Region,
the UK is
responsible for filling that gap.”
385.
The paper
concluded that the success of the Lower South ORHA office
would
depend on
UK direction and capacity in a manner analogous to ORHA’s reliance
on the
US, and
that the UK required a plan to address immediate rehabilitation
needs and to
encourage
greater long-term investment and engagement in reconstruction
activities.
The plan
should comprise:
•
Support for
the ORHA Lower South regional office, including help to
draw
up an
operational plan for rehabilitation, additional staff to help
manage
projects,
and running costs. The paper also proposed that the UK
Government
should
establish sufficient capability in the UK to manage its support
for
rehabilitation;
PJHQ would be able to offer advice to the FCO on how such
a
team should
be structured.
•
The
reallocation of the £20m allocated to the military to support
Internally
Displaced
People (IDPs), to fund QIPs.
•
Funding for
short, discrete projects to build the capacity of the
Iraqi
administration
capacity in key areas.
386.
Ministers were
invited to agree the “concept” described in the paper.
387.
The Annotated
Agenda for the AHMGIR meeting invited Ministers to agree that
the
UK should
step up the reconstruction effort in the “southern military sector”
by:
•
in the
short term, encouraging UK forces, with the assistance of DFID
advisers,
to identify
and implement QIPs;
•
over the
next month, building the capacity of ORHA(South) to identify
and
implement
reconstruction projects, including by seconding additional staff
where
necessary
and developing an operational reconstruction plan;
69