The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
309.
The JIC
Assessment ended with a section entitled ‘Outlook’, which
said:
“Iraqi
politics are paralysed. Despite upbeat claims following the recent
leadership
conference,
we see no prospect of Maliki’s government making real progress
on
key
legislation … We continue to judge that any new leader would face
similar
challenges
to Maliki: early significant improvements in government
performance
would be
unlikely.
“We judge
the levels of violence in Baghdad and across Iraq may continue
to
fall, but
only as long as the US troop surge can be sustained: the ISF, even
with
tribal
support, are not capable of maintaining the tempo or effect of
current MNF
operations
… The additional US surge can only be maintained until March 2008
…
When it
reduces, we judge that Sunni extremists and Shia militias will try
to reassert
control on
the ground.”
310.
In his weekly
update on 6 September, Maj Gen Binns described the
withdrawal
of UK
troops from Basra Palace on 2 and 3 September as “extremely
successful”.145
Although
one of the convoys was hit by an IED, there were no serious
injuries and
it arrived
back in the COB “largely unscathed” – something that would have
been
“impossible”
a month earlier.
311.
The media
coverage in Iraq and in the UK had been “largely positive”, with
the
only real
criticism that the UK was leaving a security gap in the South
coming from
the US
media.
312.
Maj Gen Binns
commented that Dr Rubaie’s decision to speak to the
media
(“in English,
so none of the message was lost in translation”) was “further
affirmation that
the
decision to hand over control of the Palace to the ISF had the full
support of the GoI”.
313.
Less
positively, Maj Gen Binns reported:
“Whilst
senior US Commanders recognise and understand the reasoning for
our
departure
from the Palace … it has become apparent that this understanding is
not
shared by
junior and mid-ranking US personnel. My staffs … detect at least a
slight
discomfort
at the UK position … at the working level, with a feeling that our
return
to the COB
will leave Southern Iraq open to malign Iranian influence and the
flow
of EFPs.
These feelings are no doubt buoyed by the address by POTUS
[President
Bush] to
military personnel in Anbar; at a tactical level, the rallying call
‘if we let our
enemies
back us out of Iraq, we will be more likely to face them in
America’ at a time
when our
own Government is announcing a reduction in troop numbers
(regardless
of how long
this has been planned) further demonstrates the perception of a
division
between UK
and US foreign policies towards Iraq.”
145
Minute
Binns to CJO, 6 September 2007, ‘GOC HQ MND(SE) – Southern Iraq
Update –
6 September 2007’.
240