The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

16. Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser and the Head of the Overseas

and Defence Secretariat (OD Sec), advised Mr Blair that a number of senior Americans,

both Republican and Democrat, were convinced that President Bush was determined on

war with Iraq; the doves in the US system were totally marginalised; it was impossible

to stand out against the jingoistic mood – people wanted war; taking on the Iraqs of

the international system was the best way of making sure that America would not be

surprised again.5 To avoid that, some Americans had urged that Europeans should

pursue a policy of tightening sanctions against Iraq, and getting an UNMOVIC (UN

Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and with teeth back on the ground

in Iraq. A former US military officer had suggested that the US would invade Iraq within

four or five months. Another American expressed doubt about whether Turkey would

support military action because of the risk of refugees flooding across its borders.

17. Sir David Manning wrote that the “rhetoric has so far been running ahead of the

reality” in the US:

“The US military have probably been told to make contingency plans … But unless

we have been pretty comprehensively deceived … no decisions have yet been taken

on how or when to bring it [regime change] about.”

18. Mr Blair responded:

“… Yes it’s desirable but how? If we can sort out “how”, do it and this is the reason

Iraq is making overtures to Iran. To avoid war, Iraq [wd] need to let the inspectors

back in.”6

19. Lord Williams of Baglan, Special Adviser to Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary,

from 2001 to 2005, told the Inquiry that he recalled that:

“By the opening months of 2002 it was becoming clearer that the Bush

Administration appeared intent on a more muscular approach on Iraq that did not

rule out military action. At the Davos meeting in January 2002 a US Senator had

told the NATO Secretary General George Robertson that President Bush was

determined on a war with Iraq and that it was ‘a cast iron certainty within the year’.

In reported remarks at the Munich security conference, in February the former NATO

commander General Wesley Clarke told interlocutors that he believed war was

inevitable.”7

20. During a telephone call with President Bush on a range of issues on 6 February

2002, Mr Blair said that “whatever President Bush may have read in the media, he

5 Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 5 February 2002, ‘US Policy Towards Iraq’.

6 Manuscript comment Blair on Minute Manning to Prime Minister, 5 February 2002, ‘US Policy Towards

Iraq’.

7 Statement, 9 January 2011, page 4.

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