6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

172. Asked to explain why the force levels had grown and were larger than had been

deployed in 1991, Lord Boyce replied that he could not answer that question: “The

package was being shaped to deal with the task that we thought we might encounter.”59

173. Lord Boyce told the Inquiry that he had expressed concern to Mr Blair at the

briefing on 15 January, which “was more about the immediate aftermath, immediately

after the fighting phase, what would we need to do to provide security in the first

instance, but also to provide what we saw as being the most immediate problem would

be a humanitarian problem”.60

174. Sir Kevin thought that “the large-scale option was a natural consequence of what

we could do or what we would plan to do”. There was “also a military view about the

sense of critical mass under national command that works well, which would have been

a feature of the Chiefs’ of Staff considerations”. He did “not at all” sense “the military

machine was forcing the political hand”.61

175. In his subsequent hearing, Sir Kevin Tebbit agreed that, when the decision was

taken, Ministers did not have “a full appreciation of the implications, politically, militarily

and security-wise”.62

176. Mr Scarlett subsequently reported additional aspects of PJHQ’s thinking to

Sir David Manning.

177. Mr Scarlett followed up some of the points raised at Mr Blair’s briefing from the

MOD in a separate briefing from Maj Gen Fry and reported his discussions to No.10.63

178. The points Mr Scarlett recorded included:

• The fact that “it will not be possible to disaggregate UK targeting from overall

US effort” was made “forcefully” to him.

• The “difficulty for Saddam of matching up his CB [chemical biological] warheads

to missiles after previous efforts to conceal them” was “stressed”.

• It was “certainly not clear … how Baghdad will be brought under control and

Saddam finished off”.

• Maj Gen Fry “thought it very possible” that the US would “eventually” ask the

UK “to lead the assault to capture the bridgehead before moving aside to let the

Americans through for a clean start”.

59 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, page 35.

60 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, page 83.

61 Public hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 39-40.

62 Private hearing, 6 May 2010, page 29.

63 Minute Scarlett to Rycroft, 16 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.

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