The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1396. Gen Reith told the Inquiry that the North was “quite a difficult area” and

“over time, and particularly with the Turkish elections, and … my sense of a lack of

enthusiasm by the Turks … for me, as the planner, it became less and less attractive

as an option”.549

1397. Gen Reith added:

“… I was unhappy with the logistic support required and the tenuous lines of

communication to actually get our logistic support to our forces.

“It was very, very tight … it was very mountainous … we were going to have to use

the river Tigris as our protection on our left flank … it wasn’t an attractive military

option for what would have been, at best, a division plus.”550

1398. Gen Reith told the Inquiry that discussions started with the US about where in

the South a land package might best be employed after his paper of 18 November. He

added that the Americans moved from thinking that the UK would definitely be going to

the North to “maybe we [the UK] should be doing the South”.551

1399. Other evidence given to the Inquiry suggested that the relative advantages

and disadvantages of the northern and southern options might have been more

balanced than some of the briefing offered to Mr Hoon and Mr Blair suggested.

1400. Gen Jackson told the Inquiry that the “relative logistic challenge” of the southern

option was “probably logistically simpler” than the northern option.552

1401. Asked about his assessment of the risks and liabilities for the UK when he saw

that the position was shifting from the North to the South, Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:

“Timing would have been one … our transit … was going to take slightly longer.

There was … a risk of the actual logistic effort but that was mitigated by the fact the

Americans were going to help us … desertification of some of the kit … required

some effort … But the Americans … were particularly helpful in making room for us

in Kuwait …”553

1402. Lord Boyce added that “substantial effort” had already been made on the

southern option and that working alongside the Amphibious Task Group helped the

logistics support, and:

“… whatever risks there were in switching to the South, in many senses were

outweighed by some of the benefits …”554

549 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, page 25.

550 Private hearing, 15 January 2010, page 27.

551 Private hearing 15 January 2010, pages 34‑35.

552 Public hearing, 28 July 2010, page 18.

553 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 23‑24.

554 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 24‑25.

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