3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Were these
the “right” tests?
•
Were there
others that could added?
•
“Should the
tests be included explicitly in a second resolution, or should
this
take the
form of a short text simply stating that Saddam Hussein is in
breach
of 1441,
while the conditions he must meet by 14 March are set out in
an
accompanying statement?”
549.
Sir David
asked for advice that day, stating that his letter and
accompanying
minute
should be held “very tightly”, handled “on a strictly need to know
basis” and
the addressees
should “keep the papers off main files”.
550.
Sir David
Manning spoke to Dr Rice before the EU Council on 17
February.152
551.
In response to
Dr Rice’s report that, in a conversation with Dr Blix
over the
weekend,
Dr Blix had “felt bad that he had given the Iraqis too much in
his …
presentation
to the Security Council”, Sir David said that Dr Blix had
“overdone the
course
correction, worried by the reaction to his earlier presentation on
27 January”.
552.
Sir David told
Dr Rice that Dr Blix “had hinted” to Mr Straw “that
he might be in
the market
for an ultimatum” and they discussed his report which would
summarise the
outstanding
disarmament questions. They also discussed whether the Security
Council
should
instruct Dr Blix to destroy the Al Samoud missiles. Sir David
commented that he
“strongly
favoured” that: “Saddam would hate having to do it and might be
provoked into
making a
mistake.”
553.
Sir David said
the UK was thinking about the shape and timing of an
ultimatum:
“We did not
have nine votes in the Security Council at present, and were
very
unlikely to
get there by 28 February … we needed time to shift three or
four
abstentions
… If it became clear that we could win, we could hope the
French
would
decide to abstain rather than veto. It was going to be a tough sell
…
Once the
ultimatum was down, and the deadline was clear, the dynamics
would
change … We
must take more time if we needed it.”
554.
In the
subsequent discussion about how to increase the number of votes in
favour
of a
resolution and whether, if there was a majority, France would
abstain rather than
veto,
Dr Rice said that would be a “tough fight” in the US
Administration about more
time. She
thought 8 March, “exactly four months” after the adoption of
resolution 1441,
might be
better than 14 March as the French wanted. Sir David commented that
he “saw
the
attraction”, but: “We must take more time if we need
it.”
152
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 17 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
279