The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
16.
The paper
stated that it was in the UK’s interest to contribute and that the
US was
“very keen”
for it to do so. But the UK needed to be clear that its willingness
to help was
conditional
on resolving two issues:
“•
‘Impartiality
mechanisms’ to ensure that Coalition activity has
international
credibility.
•
The
involvement of UNMOVIC and the IAEA once the situation is stable;
as with
the
aftermath generally, the Pentagon’s hang-ups about the UN are
getting in
the way of
common sense and our long-term interests.”
17.
The paper
stated that, if those conditions were met, during the conflict the
UK
should
contribute:
•
liaison
officers in the IEB and the CFLCC SSE Fusion Cell;
•
a Squadron
HQ of the Joint NBC (Nuclear Biological Chemical)
Regiment;
•
a
Battlefield Intelligence Recovery Team of Defence Intelligence
Staff (DIS) and
Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel;
•
a DIS
counter-terrorism expert;
•
an RAF
Provost5
and
Security Services Forensic Science Team to interrogate
computer
hardware; and
•
seven
scientists with a mobile laboratory to provide a limited analytical
capability.
18.
Additional
contributions could be made on an on-call basis through Air
Marshal
Brian
Burridge, the UK National Contingent Commander (NCC).
19.
In the
post-conflict phase, the UK could contribute the Joint NBC Regiment
HQ,
detection
assets and other Specialist Monitoring Teams.
20.
Mr Hoon
discussed the UK’s objectives and its potential contribution to the
search
for WMD
with Mr Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, and Dr
Condoleezza
Rice,
President Bush’s National Security Advisor, in Washington on
12 February
21.
The British
Embassy Washington reported agreement that “broad UN cover for
day
after
management in Iraq would bring political, financial and legal
benefits” and would
“facilitate
an UNMOVIC and IAEA role in verifying WMD clear-up”.
22.
During the
talks, Mr Jack Dyer Crouch II, Assistant Secretary of
Defense
(International
Security Policy), told Mr Hoon that Iraqi scientists would be
key to
identifying
the whereabouts of Iraq’s WMD. Because the public in the US and
elsewhere
would
expect early results, there would be “a heavy forensic input” at
the start of
the programme.
5
A member of
the RAF Police (RAFP).
6
Telegram
204 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Defence
Secretary’s Visit to
Washington:
Day After Management’.
428