9.5 | June 2006 to 27 June 2007

continues to remind both Iraqi and US audiences that the plan is in its early stages.

Success will take months, he says, not days or weeks. This chimes with General

Odierno’s emerging thinking, leaked to the New York Times last week, that the troop

surge should be maintained until February 2008. If his argument gains ground …

this will add another dimension to the debate over the renewal of UNSCR 1723.”360

680. In a letter to Mr Fletcher on 16 March, Mr Browne’s Private Secretary reported

that three investigations had been launched into the NIIA incident: one by the MNF,

one by the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and one by Prime Minister Maliki’s Ministerial

Security Adviser on Basra.361 The MOD recognised that there could not be similar

incidents. The MNF was reviewing mechanisms for informing the Iraqi Government

of sensitive operations.

681. On 20 March, Mr Blair met ACM Stirrup and senior officials for an update on Iraq.362

ACM Stirrup reported signs of improvement in security in Baghdad, though there was

some concern that JAM might simply be lying low.

682. In Basra, he wrote that a large majority of attacks continued to be directed

against the MNF, rather than being intra‑Iraqi. If policing and rule of law issues could be

addressed effectively, there was a reasonable chance that the overall level of attacks

would come down significantly post‑transition.

683. ACM Stirrup told Mr Blair that “Petraeus had been helpful in handling the fallout

from the raid on the NIIA headquarters, and that this was in any case having only a

limited effect on operations in Basra itself.”

684. Mr Blair asked about progress on political issues, and in particular reconciliation,

emphasising that “it remained one of the highest priorities in achieving long‑term

success in Iraq”. He judged that a more effective strategy was needed “which would

involve an identified US/UK figure, working with an identified Iraqi figure, both

empowered to deliver serious benefits to Sunni groups”. Mr Blair concluded that

“if necessary, we should be prepared to exert leverage on Maliki and those around

him to deliver on the political aspects of reconciliation”.

685. On the same day, Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference.363

Mr Blair welcomed the relatively positive news coming from Baghdad, observing that it

was absolutely clear that the majority of people in Iraq did not want violence. Mr Blair

said that it was important that the UK and US continued to support Prime Minister

360 eGram 10747/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 16 March 2007, ‘Iraq/Baghdad Security Plan: Week Four of

Main Operations’.

361 Letter Beadle to Fletcher, 16 March 2007, ‘Iraq: National Intelligence & Information Agency (NIIA)

Operation’.

362 Letter Banner to Hickey, 20 March 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with Officials’.

363 Letter Banner to Hayes, 20 March 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush, 20 March: Middle

East and Afghanistan’.

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