The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
198.
On 12
September, an official from the FCO Iraq Group reported to
Mr Miliband’s
Private
Secretary that Ambassador Satterfield had visited London two days
earlier and
provided UK
officials in the FCO, the MOD and the Cabinet Office with an update
on the
negotiation
of the US/Iraq SOFA.71
Ambassador
Satterfield had advised Washington that
agreement
would not be possible without US compromise on three points:
jurisdiction,
detention
and timelines. To resolve those issues, he proposed
that:
•
US military
and non-diplomatic civilian personnel would be subject to
Iraqi
jurisdiction
if they committed a serious crime while off base and not on duty;
and
•
US forces
would, in principle, hand over any detainees to the Iraqi
authorities
within 24
hours.
199.
Ambassador
Satterfield reported that both the US and the Iraq governments
had
agreed to a
reference in the SOFA that US forces should withdraw from Iraq by
2011,
but the
Iraqi Government was keen to have a more concrete
commitment.
200.
The Iraq Group
official advised Mr Miliband that Mr Browne shared US
concerns
about
jurisdiction. If the US compromised on this, the UK was unlikely to
“get a better
deal”. One
possible “fix” was to declare all UK forces “on duty” for the
duration of their
deployment
to Iraq.
201.
From 15 to 16
September, ACM Stirrup visited Iraq and Kuwait.72
He
asked
General
Raymond Odierno, Commanding General Multi-National Force – Iraq,
whether
he was
content with the plans for MND(SE) transition, reporting that Gen
Odierno had
been
“encouraged” and “comfortable” with the outline proposal though he
had yet to see
the
detailed timeline. ACM Stirrup “underlined his need to bolster
enablers in Afghanistan
as soon as
possible” though made clear that any Iraqi transition plan would
need to
meet
“mutual timeline requirements”.
202.
Mr Brown
and Mr Browne met the Chiefs of Staff and Sir Bill Jeffrey,
MOD
Permanent
Under Secretary, on 18 September.73
ACM Stirrup
reported that “remarkable
progress”
had been made in Iraq over the past 18 months, although it was
“fragile and
reversible”.
In the South, the biggest risk was stalled economic progress. ACM
Stirrup
reported
that the US commanders had high regard for the UK contribution in
Basra and
elsewhere
in Iraq and were “bought in” to a timetable that would see
“two-star UK/US
handover in
March and one-star in May”. SOFA negotiations were
“stalled”.
203.
Mr Brown
said that it would be important to have projects that helped
with
employment
in place before the UK left Basra, and to establish a UK Trade
and
Investment
(UKTI) presence there. The main obstacle was not security but the
business
71
Minute
McKelvey to Baker and Private Secretary [FCO], 12 September 2008,
‘Iraq – Update on
US Status
of Forces Negotiations’.
72
Minute Kyd
to PS/SofS [MOD], 18 September 2008, ‘CDS Visit to Iraq 15-16 Sep
08’.
73
Letter
Catsaras to Rimmer, 18 September 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Defence Chiefs,
18 September’.
414