10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
945.
The Cabinet
Office briefing for Mr Brown stated that Gen Petraeus believed
that
the UK
should mount a civilian surge, and had advocated a more hands-on
(rather
than
Iraqi-led) approach. Dr al-Safi and Prime Minister Maliki had both
recently told
UK
interlocutors that they did not think UK-led economic development
in Basra was
proceeding
quickly enough. Dr al-Safi was “resistant” to UK lobbying in favour
of
channelling
Iraqi Government funds through the Provincial
Government.
946.
The DFID
briefing for Mr Alexander stated that the US military was
becoming
increasingly
frustrated with the pace of the Provincial Government’s clear-up of
the
streets
after the fighting, and warned that the US might be tempted to take
control of
the
operation themselves.555
That would
be a significant step backwards. The PRT was
trying to
resist, but the pressure to make things happen was
strong.
947.
The briefing
also advised that DFID feared that the Iraqi
Government’s
reconstruction
money was being used as a way of consolidating central Government
or
Dawa party
control over Basra. That would represent a patronage-based,
unaccountable
way of
managing Basra.
948.
The Iraqi Army
and MND(SE) were now in control of Umm Qasr port
(previously
under militia control) and corruption and smuggling had ended. With
the
improved
security environment, it would be possible to return to US plans
for the
commercialisation
of the port.
949.
Mr Brown’s
meeting with Gen Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker covered a
range
of
political, security and economic issues (see Section
9.7).556
950.
At the
meeting, Mr Alexander described the 28 April investors’
reception as a
success,
and identified the development of the port and airport and the
capacity of
central
Government to support Basra as priorities.
951.
Summing up the
discussion, Mr Brown said that the central UK focus would
be
accelerated
training of Iraq’s 14 Division, preparations for provincial
elections, progress
on handing
control of Basra Airport to the Iraqis and economic reconstruction.
Decisions
on troop
numbers would be taken in the context of completion of these
tasks.
952.
The record of
the meeting did not report any criticism by Gen Petraeus of the
scale
or nature
of the UK’s engagement on economic development.
953.
Mr McDonald
advised Mr Brown the following day that the UK would need
to
retain around
4,100 troops in southern Iraq for the next six months to complete
those
555
Minute DFID
[junior official] to Private Secretary [DFID], 30 April 2008,
‘Briefing for Attendance at
PM/Petraeus
meeting on 1 May’.
556
Letter
Fletcher to Rimmer, 2 May 2008, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with General Petraeus, 1 May’.
557
Email
Fletcher to Brown, 2 May 2008, ‘Iraq Troop Numbers – Note from
Simon’.
349