The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
11.
By the first
week of January 2003, no date had been set for the second
round.1
12.
The FCO Iraq
Morning Meeting on 7 January concluded that Sir David
Manning,
Mr Blair’s
Foreign Policy Adviser and Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and
Defence
Secretariat
(OD Sec), should ask Dr Condoleezza Rice, President Bush’s
National
Security
Advisor, to “unblock” the talks if US officials were unable to
clear the way for a
second
round to take place in the week of 20 January.
13.
Three days
later, the FCO had arranged for the talks to take place on 22
January.2
14.
Mr Ricketts
visited Washington on 13 January. He reported to Mr Jack
Straw, the
Foreign
Secretary, that the US had done good work on humanitarian issues,
but was
distrustful
of the UN and “still clinging to … a wholly unrealistic expectation
that they
[the US]
will be welcomed in as liberators”.3
Mr Ricketts
suggested that the forthcoming
UK/US/Australia
post-conflict talks in Washington and visits by Mr Straw and
Mr Blair
later in
the month were opportunities to influence official and Presidential
thinking.
15.
Mr Ricketts’
report was copied to Sir David Manning.
16.
Mr Ricketts’
visit also exposed continuing differences between the UK and US
on
the
post-conflict role of Iraqi exiles. During talks with National
Security Council (NSC)
officials
about where to find suitable administrators for post-conflict Iraq,
Mr Ricketts
advised:
“Iraqi exiles were unlikely to come into this category or carry
much credibility
17.
At the first
FCO Iraq Morning Meeting after his return from Washington,
Mr Ricketts
reported
that:
“… the US
show no sign of accepting our arguments on transitional
administrations.
They are
wedded to the idea of a prolonged US occupation, and opposed to
any
substantial
role for the UN. We are likely to find the 22 January day after
talks hard
18.
On 13 January,
US officials briefed the British and Australian Embassies
in
Washington
on US humanitarian planning. The British Embassy reported that
the
US had
“what appeared to be a well researched and internally co-ordinated
planning
document”,
focused on the provision of emergency relief by the US military
until the
UN and
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) could resume their
activities. The
US military
would set up a Civil-Military Operations Centre (CMOC) HQ and
regional
branches.
Each branch would incorporate a Disaster Assistance Response
Team
(DART) and
a US Agency for International Development (USAID) presence to
facilitate
1
Minute
Chilcott to PS/PUS [FCO], 7 January 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting:
Key Points’.
2
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.
3
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The
Mood in Washington’.
4
Telegram 47
Washington to FCO London, 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After Issues:
Ricketts Visit to
Washington.
13 January’.
5
Minute
Tanfield to PS/PUS, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq Morning Meeting: Key
Points’.
310