The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1449.
On 29 March,
the Director of Joint Commitments reported to
Mr Browne’s
Assistant
Private Secretary that he considered “little tangible success has
been achieved
by either
side, and sustained conflict looks set to
continue”.1322
1450.
An eGram on
the same day stated that the Iraqi media were reporting that
over
a hundred
police officers had been sacked in Basra, apparently for losing
their weapons
and/or
abandoning their posts during the recent clashes.1323
1451.
On 31 March,
it was reported that questions had been asked at the
MCNS
meeting
that day about the reports of police desertions in Baghdad and
allegations of
poor
co‑operation between the police and army.1324
The
representative of the MOI told
the Council
that “only 10 percent of the national Police had proven
ineffective” and that
more than
400 police had been dismissed in Basra in recent days for
“disloyalty”.
1452.
On 14 April,
the CIG assessed ISF performance in MND(SE) during Charge of
the
Knights.1325
It referred
back to the JIC’s Assessment on 27 February, reporting that
the
JIC had
correctly predicted that:
•
The ISF
would rely on MNF support – “… on their own, the ISF
underperformed
against JAM
in Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar during recent operations. In
Basra
they relied
heavily on MNF supplies (i.e. ammunition and rations), air
strikes
and
eventually MNF mentoring. […] Military reporting suggested little
sign of
a detailed
operational plan or evidence of precision targeting of JAM
Special
Groups or
other hard‑line elements until the arrival of MNF training teams
from
1 April.”
•
The
influence of Shia militias would hinder radical improvement in
the
effectiveness
of Basra’s police – “Basra’s Chief of Police reportedly
believes
that
hundreds of local police melted away within the first 24 hours of
fighting –
others
joined JAM’s ranks. Reporting that several police stations and
dozens of
police
vehicles were abandoned in the face of militia intimidation
supports this.
Many of the
National Police units drafted in from Baghdad, with superior
arms
and armour,
fared much better. The affiliation of many to ISCI [Islamic
Supreme
Council in
Iraq]/Badr probably strengthened their resolve to try and weaken
their
chief rival
[JAM].”
•
The 10th
and 14th Divisions of the IA would require assistance from
outside
the South
to cope with serious and sustained violence – “… even
with
reinforcements
from Baghdad’s 1st Division, military reporting suggests that
the
Iraqi Army
lost most tactical engagements against JAM and failed to take
any
ground
prior to JAM’s stand down on 31st March. However, neither did
they
cede ground
and specific successes, such as taking charge of the
strategically
1322
Minute DJC
to SofS/APS4 [MOD], 29 March 2008, ‘Basra: MOD
Update’.
1323
eGram
11975/08 Basra to FCO London, 29 March 2008, ‘Basra – Update – 29
March’.
1324
eGram
12023/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 March 2008, ‘Iraq: Baghdad:
Security and Political
Update,
Sunday 30 March’.
1325
CIG
Assessment, 14 April 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces Performance in
MND(SE)’.
390