The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

staff and how quickly the reductions could happen. This and an updated version of the

FCO paper would be discussed by the ISG in mid-January, then put to a meeting of

NSID(OD) chaired by the Foreign Secretary in early February and finally to a meeting

of NSID(OD) chaired by the Prime Minister in early March.

696. On 14 December, a Private Secretary confirmed that Mr Miliband was content to

delegate authority to Mr Prentice to take the decision about when to release JAM1.323

He said that Mr Miliband believed that the negotiations had “proven their worth” and

had “confidence in the team working on this”. The Private Secretary explained that

Mr Miliband would be available should the team want further consultation.

697. Security responsibility for Basra province transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control

on 16 December.324 Mr Miliband attended the handover ceremony for the UK, and

Dr Rubaie for the Iraqi Government.325

698. After the transition in Basra, all of the four provinces within MND(SE) were under

Iraqi control, with “overwatch” support from UK and other coalition forces.

699. In total, nine Iraqi provinces had made the transition to PIC, half of the total.326

700. After the ceremony, Mr Miliband remained in Iraq to visit Baghdad and Erbil.327

Mr Prentice reported that Mr Miliband told “Zebari and Maliki that PIC in Basra would

not mean any diminution of our effort or commitment but did mark a new stage in

our relationship”. Mr Miliband also “urged on all … the need for political leadership to

unblock vital legislation and make progress on political reconciliation”.

701. In his visit report to Mr Brown, Mr Miliband said that “Iraqi press coverage [of the

handover] was on the whole favourable, characterising the event as a restoration of

national authority.”328

702. Mr Miliband wrote:

“In spite of some of the recent press reporting, security has undoubtedly improved,

not just in Basra but in Iraq as a whole. Attacks of all sorts have remained for

10 straight weeks now at levels last seen consistently in the middle of 2005.”

703. Mr Miliband attributed the improvement to political factors including the Anbar

Awakening, the physical separation of Sunni and Shia communities in Baghdad, the

323 Email Hickey to FCO Iraq Group [junior official], 14 December 2007, ‘Iraq: [NAME OF OPERATION]:

further advice’.

324 BBC News, 23 March 2009, Timeline: UK Troops in Basra.

325 Minute Rollo to CDS, 17 December 2007, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (281) 16 Dec 07’.

326 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 14 December 2007, ‘Iraq Strategy Group,

13 December’.

327 eGram 51785/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraq: SofS Visit to Baghdad

16‑17 December’.

328 Minute Miliband to Brown, 27 December 2007, ‘My Visit to Iraq: 16-18 December’.

310