3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
721.
Sir Jeremy
asked for instructions and comments on a draft statement,
writing:
“I have
assumed you will want to be fairly strong on the
French.”
722.
Mr Campbell
wrote that a meeting on 17 March between Mr Blair,
Mr Prescott,
Mr Brown,
Mr Straw, Dr Reid and Ms Armstrong had:
“… agreed
Greenstock would put down the SCR at 10.15 New York time, that
we
would say
at the 11[am briefing for the media] there would be a Cabinet at 4,
Jack’s
statement
later and also that the Attorney General would publish his view
that there
was a solid
legal base for action. Jack would go through the motions of
chatting to
his
opposite numbers but basically the game was up.”248
723.
Mr Straw
spoke to Secretary Powell at lunchtime to brief him on the
timetable for
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock’s announcement of the end of the diplomatic route,
Cabinet
and his
Parliamentary Statement.249
Mr Straw
also informed Secretary Powell that
Lord
Goldsmith had issued legal advice to the effect that a second
resolution was not
necessary
for military operations.
724.
Mr Blair
discussed his efforts to rally political support in the UK with
President Bush
at 12.45pm
on 17 March.250
The
publication of the Road Map and the public airing of
the UN role
post-conflict had had a positive effect. They also discussed the
positions
of
Dr Blix and other members of the Security
Council.
725.
Mr Blair
commented that: “It should not be forgotten how many times Saddam
had
given the
UN supposed full and final declarations of his WMD.” Keeping the UN
“in play”
was “a high
priority with British opinion”.
726.
Sir Roderic
Lyne reported that President Putin had stated earlier that day
that
“a possible
war in Iraq is a mistake fraught with the gravest consequences,
which may
result in
casualties and destabilise the international system in
general”.251
727.
Mr Straw
telephoned Mr Ivanov at lunchtime to confirm that he was
anxious that
the UK and
Russia should maintain good relations despite “current
difficulties” and his
hope
that:
“… even if
military action appeared necessary, the UK and US could still
make
good use
of the UN, especially on post-conflict reconstruction and
relief.”252
248
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
249
Note
McDonald, 18 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with US Secretary of
State, 17 March’.
250
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 17 March’.
251
Telegram 87
Moscow to FCO London, 17 March 2003, ‘Russia/Iraq’.
252
Telegram 48
FCO London to Moscow, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s
Conversation with
Russian
Foreign Minister, 17 March’.
527