3.5 | Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002

3.5 | Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –

the negotiation of resolution 1441

692. Sir David wrote that he had told Mr Straw there were “signs of mounting impatience

in the White House with the whole UN process”. He added:

“Apparent evidence, too, that this is pushing the White House to consider putting

the resolution down, and challenging the French (and Russians) to block it. Condi’s

mood this morning was that the US had made enough concessions. If the UN

process failed, Paris and Moscow would be responsible for the broken UN china …”

693. Sir David Manning advised Mr Blair that he should tell President Bush to persist

with the UN route despite the frustrations and that “real negotiations” were “just

beginning”. The domestic pressures on President Bush to do so were considerable.

There was nervousness in Middle America about war on Iraq without UN cover, or

without UK company. That gave the UK “leverage in the UN context”.

694. In his conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair accepted that the negotiations

in New York were in pretty good shape: the three vital elements in the resolution were

material breach, the declaration of Iraqi WMD, and the tough inspection regime.236

695. Mr Blair’s view was that those provisions should not be weakened. If they were

agreed, the UK could accept a further Security Council discussion in the event of a

breach, but “on the understanding that either this discussion would then authorise action

or if it did not we would go ahead anyway”.

696. To ensure that President Bush understood the UK position, Mr Blair underlined the

importance for the UK of securing the first resolution.

697. Mr Blair also stated that he continued to think that tough inspections just might lead

to the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime.

698. A draft resolution agreed by the US and UK was tabled in the Security

Council on 23 October 2002.

699. The US/UK draft resolution was presented to the full Security Council on

23 October.237

700. Delegations were invited to refer the text, “which remained a working document”,

to capitals.238

701. The key changes to the text agreed by the US and UK at the end of September

are set out in the Box below.239

236 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush,

23 October’.

237 Telegram 2031 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Draft Resolution

of 23 October’.

238 Telegram 2030 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK/US Text Presented

to the Security Council’.

239 Telegram 2031 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 23 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Draft Resolution

of 23 October’.

323