The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“So we had
misgivings about whether we should be too closely associated with
what
ORHA was
doing. We also had other reasons to hesitate about the day after,
which
was to do
with the legality of ORHA’s ambition. ORHA had quite a high degree
of
ambition in
the amount of reform and reconstruction it was proposing, and we
felt
without
specific Security Council authorisation this would go beyond what
we were
allowed to
do as Occupying Powers on the basis of the Geneva Convention and
the
Hague
Regulations. So we had a legal issue and we had a kind of policy
issue about
whether
this should be a DoD beast, that made us hesitant. We certainly
reported
our views
on the shortcomings of ORHA when we went back.”233
546.
Asked what the
reaction had been in London, Mr Chilcott
explained:
“We doubled
our efforts in our bilaterals with the Americans to try and swing
them
back into a
sort of concept of operations that we felt was more likely to
bring
success.
“So the
ORHA Rock Drill was on 21 and 22 February, the Prime Minister
chaired a
Ministerial
meeting on day after issues on 6 March, which … raised the high
level of
Ministerial
engagement on these issues, and Mike O’Brien … led discussions on
day
after
issues on 13 March, which I attended as well, and then there was
the 16 March
Azores
Summit.
“So there
were a series of high level events where we were making our points
to the
Americans.”
“I can’t
remember the lack of sense of preparation on the American side for
a clear
post-war
plan ever being brought up as a reason for the UK not to be
involved in
whatever
operation might be coming, because at the same time we had much
bigger
things to
worry about.
…
“And this
may seem difficult to believe, but even until quite late in the
day, we were
not sure
ourselves in the Foreign Office … whether the UK would be involved
… we
were only
absolutely sure a relatively few number of days before things
kicked off
that we
were going to be involved.
“And there
was even that wobble … when Rumsfeld said on television that if
the
UK wants to
come with us that’s fine, but if they don’t, we understand and we
will
go it alone
[see Section 3.8]. And that, I think, reflected at the time genuine
doubt,
certainly
within the IPU and, I think, more widely in Whitehall, as to
whether we were
really
going to be engaged or not.”234
233
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 21-23.
234
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, pages 25-26.
406