The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We need to
go back to the basic principle: the UN has made a decision;
that
decision
must be upheld. The inspectors inspect; if they find a breach, then
the UN
should pass
a new resolution. If it does, how can anyone dispute the case for
war?
If the UN
doesn’t, despite a breach, then we are in the same positions as we
were
at the
time of Kosovo. But the integrity of the UN process has to be
upheld.
“We have
two immediate weaknesses in our case:
•
people
think we will go to war even if no breach is found. That is not
correct.
•
people
don’t really believe WMD or Saddam are real threats.”
503.
Mr Ricketts
was in Washington on 13 January.176
He reported to
Mr Straw’s
Private Secretary
that his overriding impression was that:
“… there is
still a good deal of uncertainty and confusion, but that all accept
we are
entering a
critical four weeks, in which the tensions between the political/UN
track
and the
military build‑up will come to a head … the President is getting
impatient
and wants a
basis for moving against Iraq sooner rather than
later.
“There are
conflicting pressures in all directions … the press are full of
the
drum‑beat
of military build‑up. With the sense that war is close, people want
to rally
round the
President. On the other hand there is still a lot of uneasiness …
White
House
letters are running nine to one against the war.
“… there
will be big pressure on President Bush to say something powerful in
the
State of
the Union message on 28 January. I was assured … this would not be
a
declaration
of war. But equally no‑one thinks that he will want the present
uncertainty
to drag on
… there is no work in hand on how to sustain the present strategy
over
a period
of months.
“Blix will
be the fulcrum in the coming weeks … All I talked to were
determined not
to allow
Saddam to put us back in the position where the onus was on the
inspectors
to find
something …”
504.
Mr Ricketts
reported that the US was considering a presentation setting
out
“the evidence
of Saddam’s bad faith” soon after 27 January to “challenge the
Security
Council to
go for a second resolution”. Views amongst US officials on the
wisdom of that
were
mixed.
505.
Mr Ricketts’
minute was copied to Sir David Manning and
others.
506.
In the context
of a “flurry of comment … in the UK media” and Mr Blair’s
press
conference
later that day, Sir David told Dr Rice on 13 January that
Mr Blair would point
176
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 14 January 2003, ‘Iraq: The
Mood in Washington’.
90