The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
33.
US and UK
objectives for the resolution were different, and in several
substantive
respects
the text of resolution 1483 differed from the UK’s preferred
position.
34.
The UK wanted
oil revenues to be controlled by an Iraqi body, or failing that by
the
UN or World
Bank, in line with the pre-invasion promise to use them exclusively
for the
benefit of
Iraq. Instead, resolution 1483 placed the power to spend the
Development
Fund for
Iraq into the hands of the CPA, overseen by a monitoring board.
That was in
line with
US objectives, but did not address UK concerns.
35.
The UK
considered that an Interim Iraqi Administration should have real
powers,
and not be
subordinate to the CPA. Resolution 1483 said that the CPA would
retain
its
responsibilities until an internationally recognised representative
government was
established.
The text did not go so far as to require an interim administration
to report
formally to
the CPA, as the US wished, but that was in effect how the
relationship
between the
CPA and the Governing Council established by resolution 1483
operated.
36.
The UK’s
policy position was that the UN should take the lead in
establishing the
Interim
Iraqi Administration. Resolution 1483 gave the UN a role working
with the people
of Iraq and
the CPA, but did not give it the lead. Evidence considered by the
Inquiry
suggests
that there was consistent reluctance on the part of the UN to take
on such
a role
and the UK position was therefore not wholly
realistic.
37.
Resolution
1483 formally designated the UK and US as joint Occupying
Powers
in Iraq. It
also set the conditions for the CPA’s dominance over post-invasion
strategy
and policy
by handing it control of funding for reconstruction and influence
on political
development
at least equal to that of the UN.
38.
By the time
resolution 1483 was adopted, the CPA was already operating in
Iraq
under the
leadership of Ambassador L Paul Bremer, reporting to Mr Donald
Rumsfeld,
the US
Defense Secretary. There was no reporting line from the CPA to the
UK.
39.
The
resolution’s designation of the US and UK as joint Occupying Powers
did not
reflect the
reality of the Occupation. The UK contribution to the CPA’s effort
was much
smaller
than that of the US and was particularly concerned with
Basra.
40.
The UK took an
early decision to concentrate its effort in one geographical
area
rather than
accept a national lead for a particular element of the Coalition
effort (such
as police
reform). However, it was inevitable that Iraq’s future would be
determined
in Baghdad,
as both the administrative centre and the place where the power
shift
from
minority Sunni rule to majority Shia rule was going to be most
keenly felt. Having
decided to
concentrate its effort on an area some distance removed from the
capital,
the UK’s
ability to influence policy under debate in Baghdad was
curtailed.
41.
In Baghdad
itself, the UK provided only a small proportion of the staff for
the military
and
civilian headquarters. The low numbers were influenced in part by
reasonable
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