Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
469.  In an email to Mr Scarlett on 17 September, Mr Powell wrote:
“The dossier is good and convincing for those who are prepared to be convinced
“I have only three points, none of which affect the way the document is drafted
or presented
“First the document does nothing to demonstrate a threat, let alone an imminent
threat from Saddam In other words it shows he has the means but it does not
demonstrate he has the motive to attack his neighbours let alone the west We will
need to make clear in launching the document that we do not claim to have evidence
that he is an imminent threat The case we are making is that he has continued to
develop WMD since 1998, and is in breach of UN resolutions The international
community has to enforce those resolutions if the UN is to be taken seriously
“Second we will be asked about connections with Al Qaida […]
“Third, if I was Saddam I would take a party of western journalists to the Ibn Sina
factory or one of the others pictured in the document to demonstrate there is nothing
there How do we close off that avenue to him in advance?”231
470.  In his response Mr Scarlett stated:
A note was being prepared on Iraq and Al Qaida.
The dossier stressed the problems [in identifying prohibited activities], posed
by dual-use facilities and the ease of concealment. That “applied to trained
inspectors let alone journalists”.232
471.  Mr Campbell commented:
“I think we risk complicating the issue if we get into links with Al Qaida The dossier,
and the debate in Parliament, are explicitly about Iraq/WMD On the question of
sites, we should in our briefing make clear that we assume he will sanitise one
of them for the media, and pull some stunt, but remain robust re our judgements
Re the ‘imminent threat’, point, that is why TB’s foreword sets out ‘the case I am
making’. John, I will show him your revisions and hopefully get the Foreword signed
off today”.233
472.  In a further email on 18 September, Mr Powell emphasised that he was “not
suggesting any changes to the dossier, just flagging up points where we are going
to need to mould expectations in advance of publication and on publication”.234
231  Email Powell to Scarlett, 17 September 2002, ‘Dossier’.
232  Email Scarlett to Powell, 18 September 2002, ‘Re Dossier’.
233  Email Campbell to Scarlett and Powell, 18 September 2002, ‘Re: Dossier’.
234  Email Powell to Campbell and Scarlett, 18 September 2002, ‘Re: Dossier’.
202
Previous page | Contents | Next page