12.1 | Security Sector Reform

383. On 25 March, the FCO’s Weekly Update on Iraq for No.10 stated that a CENTCOM

review had concluded that transition to local control across Iraq was “likely to be delayed

by up to eight months from their original over optimistic target of May 2004”.332 That was

due to delays in MOI programmes. The paper stated that that was “not a surprise”:

“The Iraqi Security Forces do not just have to be hired; they must be vetted, trained,

equipped, mentored and certified ie capability, not numbers, is the key … Bremer

has been pushing for quality for months, without the support in Washington, where

the emphasis has been on numbers. On the positive side, a lesson has now been

learned.”

384. In March, Lt Gen Sanchez announced that once the ISF proved capable and

credible enough to maintain local security, Coalition Forces would redeploy to bases

outside major cities.333 From there they would co‑ordinate with the Iraqis and provide

Quick Reaction Forces, but the ISF would have daily policing and patrolling duties.

385. Maj Gen Stewart in his evidence to the Inquiry reflected on the growing violence

by February/March.334 He said:

“… because we had made Security Sector Reform our main effort … because it is

our ticket out of there eventually – we have seen a fight against what we are starting

to achieve in terms of Security Sector Reform.

“So there are people who are clearly unhappy at the police becoming even relatively

effective, because they never became anything close to being effective.”

386. In April, the security situation declined dramatically, with uprisings in Fallujah and

Najaf, described in Section 9.2. Maj Gen Stewart told the Inquiry how “it was like a

switch had been flicked” on 6 April, when there were “35 shooting incidents and attacks

in Basra before 7.30 in the morning”.335

387. Maj Gen Stewart described another incident on 21 April in which five simultaneous

car bombs were detonated in Basra and az‑Zubayr, killing around 70 people and injuring

around 250. He said this was “all aimed at the Iraqi police because our SSR was

working”.

332 Minute Owen to Cannon, 25 March 2004, ‘Iraq: Weekly Update’ attaching paper FCO ‘Iraq: No 10

Weekly Update’.

333 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

334 Public hearing, 9 December 2009, page 67.

335 Public hearing, 9 December 2009, pages 67‑68.

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