The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
267.
Although the
NIA would have a role in internal disaster relief operations, the
Order
was
explicit that:
“The New
Iraqi Army shall not have or exercise, domestic law enforcement
functions,
nor
intervene in the domestic political affairs of the
nation.”
268.
Ambassador
Bremer was established as Commander in Chief, pending transfer
of
the role to
an “internationally recognised, representative government,
established by the
people of
Iraq”.
269.
Suitability
for employment in the NIA would be judged on a number of
criteria,
including:
•
“the
absence of evidence of human rights violations or war
crimes”;
•
“the
absence of affiliation with the security and political control
organs of the
former
regime”; and
•
“the
absence of association with Extremist Organisations or other groups
that
use or
advocate the use of violence for political purposes whether
internal or
international”.
270.
In early
August, the first 1,000 Iraqi Army recruits were sent by the CPA
for basic
training in
Kirkush (north east of Baghdad) by CMATT.225
271.
On 5
September, Secretary Rumsfeld ordered an acceleration of the
programme to
train the
Iraqi Army, stating that the three planned Divisions must be ready
by September
2004.226
The budget
to achieve this was increased from US$173m to
US$2.2bn.
272.
Hard
Lessons records that
Secretary Rumsfeld made the decision to halve training
time to one
year during a visit to Iraq in August 2003, as security was
worsening.227
The
Governing Council (GC) was an Iraqi group with powers set out in
Authorities of the
Governing
Council, agreed between international forces and members of the GC.
It met
for the
first time on 13 July 2003 and is explained in more detail in
Section 9.2.228
The
agreement enabled the GC to make policy in all areas, including
“the rebuilding and/
or reform
of Iraq’s armed forces, police and justice sector … [and] ensuring
that Iraq’s
police and
military are depoliticised”.229
225
Wright
Dr DP & Reese Col TR. On Point
II: Transition to the New Campaign – The United States
Army
in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003 – January 2005. Combined
Studies Institute Press, June 2008.
226
Wright
Dr DP & Reese Col TR. On Point
II: Transition to the New Campaign – The United States
Army
in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM May 2003 – January 2005. Combined
Studies Institute Press, June 2008.
227
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
228
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold, 2006.
229
Telegram 81
IraqRep to FCO London, 13 July 2003, ‘Iraq: Governing Council:
Authorities’.
116