3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
449.
Following a
discussion with key officials, which is addressed in Section
6.1,
Mr Hoon
wrote to Mr Blair, on 22 March, stating:
“The key
strategic problem is the spread of WMD – of which Saddam is only
one
unpleasant
dimension. A more active counter-proliferation strategy is required
for
the region
as a whole (for example any Iraqi government will seek WMD if Iran
is
getting
them so our strategy must cover both). On Iraq, we should support
President
Bush and be
ready for a military contribution … [W]e should be involved in the
detail
before we
commit our forces.”
“… In
objective terms, Iran may be the greater problem for the UK …
Ironically, we
have Saddam
Hussein bound into an established control mechanism. There is
some
substance
in the US view that he as an individual is at the root of the WMD
risk in
Iraq. But
any Iraqi government is likely to try and achieve a balance of
forces with
Iran. I
strongly support the parallel campaign by Jack [Straw] to tackle
Iran through
450.
Mr Hoon
identified three factors that the UK should keep in mind in
considering
how to
support President Bush:
“•
The US
already has heavy land forces in the region … [and] is planning on
the
basis that
it would take 90 days to deploy all necessary forces to the region;
it
would take
us longer.
•
Despite 10
years of searching, no one has found a credible successor
to
Saddam.
•
If a
coalition takes control of Baghdad (especially without catching
Saddam),
it will
probably have to stay there for many years.”
451.
Mr Hoon wrote
that the UK “should support President Bush and be ready for
a
military
contribution” for Iraq. Mr Hoon cautioned that the UK
was:
“… not
privy to detailed US planning, either strategically across the
region or on
Iraq.
Before any decision to commit British forces, we ought to know that
the US
has a
militarily plausible plan with a reasonable prospect of success
compared to
the risks
and within the framework of international law. Our involvement in
planning
would
improve their process – and help address our lead time problem. It
would
enable
either CDS to reassure you that there is a sound military plan or
give you a
basis to
hold back if the US cannot find a sensible scheme … I suggest one
of your
objectives
at Crawford should be to secure agreement to the UK’s participation
in
US military
planning …”
161
Letter Hoon
to Prime Minister, 22 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
467