The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

the Iraqis even responded. Ricardo [Lagos] then explained that, in this case, he

couldn’t really participate in an obviously futile charade at the UNSC. The UN route

was blocked.”223

656. In his statement for the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:

“… the strength of the French statements of opposition and his internal politics made

President Lagos say, reasonably enough, that he could not support what was going

to be not only a resolution doomed to a veto, but one strongly attacked by certain

P5 members.”224

657. In a declaration on 15 March, France, with Germany and Russia, attempted

to secure support in the Security Council for continued inspections.

658. In a declaration late on 15 March, France, Germany and Russia appealed to

Security Council members to “make every effort to ensure” that a peaceful approach

prevailed to meet the shared goal of the international community for the disarmament

of Iraq.225 The points made in the declaration included:

• The inspections regime in resolution 1441 was “unprecedented”.

• A reaffirmation that “nothing in current circumstances justifies abandoning the

inspections process or resorting to force”.

• The “successive reports” to the Security Council by Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei had

shown that inspections were “producing results” and that disarmament of Iraq

had begun. There was “every reason to believe that it can be completed rapidly

and in accordance with the rules set out by the Council. Iraq, for its part, must

co-operate actively and unconditionally.”

• “France, Russia and Germany, supported by China” had “submitted proposals”

to achieve disarmament “by defining key disarmament tasks and establishing

a rigorous timetable”.

• “Suggestions in the same spirit” had “been put forward by other members of

the Council”.

• The unity of the Security Council could be preserved, and all members bore

“a particular responsibility for ensuring” it was “not divided at this crucial time”.

• When UNMOVIC’s work programme was submitted to the Security Council, the

Council should meet “immediately thereafter at the ministerial level to approve

key disarmament tasks and establish an implementation timetable” which was

“both demanding and realistic”.

223 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

224 Statement, 14 January 2011, page 9.

225 UN Security Council, 18 March 2003, ‘Letter dated 15 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative

of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’ (S/2003/320).

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