The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
warned that
if the legal basis for their presence was not resolved by the end
of the year,
British
troops would have to leave.
219.
The
“accommodation” reached with JAM was, in Prime Minister Maliki’s
view, a
“disaster”.
The
Times observed
that “Iraq’s Prime Minister appears to have decided
that,
at a
critical juncture, British Forces put their own security ahead of
Basra’s”.
220.
Mr Ian
Forber, Head of the MOD Iraq Policy Team, briefed the Iraq Strategy
Group
on 15
October that the US had given its SOFA text to Prime Minister
Maliki, “who had
apparently
agreed it”.81
The next
steps were for the Council of Ministers and the Iraqi
Parliament
to consider it. The MOD and FCO view was that the US text would
be
sufficient
for the UK’s needs. MOD officials would advise the Defence
Secretary that the
UK should
pursue its own legal arrangements based closely on the US text, and
that he
should tell
Prime Minister Maliki that when visiting Baghdad on 19
October.
221.
The Iraq
Strategy Group also discussed alternative scenarios in case the UK
did
not
conclude its own legal agreement. Contingency planning for
withdrawal was in place
and it
could be done within three months. Mr Forber told the Group
that there was legal
provision
under Coalition Provisional Authority Order No.17 which was still
in force. If
withdrawal
did happen, early discussions would be needed with the US to give
them
“time to
back-fill”.
222.
Mr McDonald
commented that the option of a further resolution had not been
ruled
out, though
would be difficult. The Group tasked the MOD and the FCO to produce
a
negotiating
timetable and a public and diplomatic handling plan.
223.
Mr Forber
and his deputy also updated the Group on planning for
transition,
which was
taking place against a range of scenarios. Plans had been
co-ordinated with
the US:
“In
particular, including their plans to backfill us as we drawdown
and, if we were
forced to
withdraw earlier, a plan for them to backfill more rapidly, also
covering what
assistance
we would need from the US to withdraw.”
224.
A day later,
Mr Prentice reported from Baghdad that negotiations on a
US/Iraq
SOFA had
entered their “endgame”, meaning that the UK could “finally launch
our
own bid for
a bilateral agreement”.82
Although
the UK’s objective of a broader bilateral
relationship
was consistent with Prime Minister Maliki’s own aims,
Mr Prentice observed
that “he
remains deeply suspicious of us and feels politically besieged”.
Those factors,
plus a
tight deadline, made the UK/Iraq agreement “a difficult trick to
take”.
81
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 21 October 2009,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 15 October’.
82
eGram
41161/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 16 October 2008, ‘Iraq: Visit by
the Defence Secretary to
Baghdad:
Scenesetter’.
418