The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
789.
Mr Duelfer
called on Mr Scarlett and Mr Tony Pawson,
Mr Howard’s successor
as DCDI,
on 28 May.440
Mr Scarlett
reported the main points from both discussions to
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald:
•
ISG work.
Interviews with HVDs, including Saddam Hussein, remained a
priority
but were
yielding little specific information. The ISG was still trying to
establish
whether
there were specific Iraqi policies to maintain or develop
industrial
capacity
with an embedded or inherent WMD production capability. High
priority
was being
given to work on terrorists’ and insurgents’ capacity to obtain
or
produce WMD
for immediate use.
•
ISG status.
Mr Tenet had assured Mr Duelfer that the ISG’s status
would not
change
while Mr Duelfer remained in charge. For legal purposes, after
30 June
the ISG
would have to fall under the remit of the Multi-National Force –
Iraq
(MNF-I).
Day-to-day operational command should remain with
CENTCOM.
•
ISG report.
Mr Duelfer envisaged that a first draft would be ready by June
but
a final
text would “not be ready until August”. This would be a
“comprehensive”
report, but
not a “final” one. It would have much to say on regime intent
and
would make
clear many questions remained open. Mr Duelfer would not
commit
to specific
dates for publication or his departure from the ISG.
•
Management.
Mr Duelfer was anxious to work with the UK. He was open
to
comments
and views on content and presentation, but was clear that the
report
would be
his own. Mr Pawson and Mr Dowse would stay in close touch
with
Mr Duelfer
and Washington.
•
Release of
HVDs. There was concern that, with the release of most
HVDs
before
30 June, some might go to the press to allege mistreatment
and
press the
case that WMD had never existed. There was a danger that
could
undermine
the authority of the ISG report.
790.
In his memoir,
Mr Duelfer explained that support for the ISG was at its
highest
during June
2004, in the weeks leading up to the transfer of
sovereignty:
“ISG
analysts developed new targeting packages … Planning for a final
pulse of
raids was
accelerated … All the agencies in Washington and the military in
the field
understood
the importance of getting to the bottom of the WMD
question.”441
791.
Maj Gen Dayton
handed over command of the ISG to Brigadier General
Joseph McMenamin
on 12 June.442
792.
Before his
departure, Maj Gen Dayton discussed the future of the ISG
with
Mr Pawson.
Mr Pawson reported to Mr Scarlett that, while some
reconfiguring of the ISG
440
Minute
Scarlett to Sheinwald, 3 June 2004, ‘Iraq Survey Group:
Update’.
441
Duelfer
C. Hide and
Seek: The Search for Truth in Iraq. Public
Affairs, 2009.
442
Letter
Pawson to Scarlett, 9 June 2004, ‘Iraq: WMD: Future of the
Iraq Survey Group’.
578