The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
236.
Mr Williams
wrote to Mr Hoon on the same day, informing him that the
Chiefs
of Staff
had now endorsed the prioritised list of UORs for Iraq as
requested.112
He
attached
the list and asked Mr Hoon to agree that work should now be
taken forward
as recommended
in his minute of 4 October.
237.
Mr Williams
added that Treasury officials had confirmed that the
MOD’s
interpretation
of access to the Reserve was shared by Mr Brown and they were
ready
to agree
the commitment of resources.
238.
The list of
UORs covered all three Packages and included:
•
communications
equipment;
•
force
protection measures, including NBC equipment and defensive aid
suites;
and
•
desertisation
measures including clothing, hydration systems and sand
filters.
239.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office commented:
“I suggest
we have a system whereby we see the papers in parallel and draw
any
dodgy
looking ones to your attention.”113
240.
Before
agreeing Mr Williams’ advice, Mr Hoon’s Private Office
wrote to Sir David
Manning on
11 October with an update on the UOR process, explaining the
approvals
process and
that wider consultation was necessary to ensure that cost
information was
“soundly
based”:
“This
consultation will be carefully controlled but will inevitably
increase the risk of
wider
disclosure. In the majority of cases, this is unlikely to excite
public interest.
But the
nature of the work involved with some of the essential requirements
… will
inevitably
lead to comment and speculation that they are linked to preparation
for
Iraq. The
Defence Secretary judges nevertheless that it is necessary to
initiate this
work now to
meet likely timescales and has therefore authorised it to
proceed”.114
241.
On
15 October, Mr Hoon’s Private Office wrote to
Mr Williams, agreeing that the
necessary
work should now be undertaken to progress the full range of the
prioritised
(Tranche 1)
UORs.115
Mr Hoon
had asked for a copy of all approvals paperwork so
that
he could
“maintain an awareness of progress, and be forewarned of any
particularly
contentious
items”. It would also be useful for Mr Williams to provide
“the weekly
summary of
progress” he was understood to be producing.
112
Minute DCRS
to APS2/Secretary of State [MOD], 9 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
UORs’.
113
Manuscript
comment MOD [junior official] on Minute DCRS to APS2/Secretary of
State [MOD],
9 October
2002, ‘Iraq: UORs’.
114
Letter
Williams to Manning, 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contributions – Urgent Operational
Requirements’.
115
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to DCRS, 15 October 2002, ‘Iraq:
UORs’.
36