3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
562.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that US “understood and accepted”
the
UK’s need for a second resolution but did not want this “spelt
out”
in the resolution.
563.
Reporting on
discussions in New York on 16 October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock
wrote
that the
latest US draft was intended to show that the US had taken French
concerns
seriously
and made an effort to meet them halfway.180
The
reference to “all necessary
means” had
been removed and the draft provided for a Security Council meeting.
The
US would
not agree to the Council “explicitly taking the decision to approve
force; but
that did
not mean that the Council would not take it”. Sir Jeremy reported
that President
Bush had
personally approved the draft text in OP10.
564.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that he had told Ambassador Negroponte that
Mr Straw
had made
clear to Secretary Powell that the UK “needed a second resolution.
It was
extremely
unlikely we could find a legal basis without it.” The US
“understood and
accepted”
the UK need for a second resolution; “but it didn’t have to be
spelt out in the
resolution”.
Sir Jeremy had agreed but warned that, if the formulation in the
draft “made
it through
the Council, the explanations of vote were likely to make it
unequivocally clear
there
needed to be a second resolution”.
565.
In relation to
a discussion about the political importance of interviews to the
US,
Sir Jeremy
reported that the language on interviews would be unchanged. In
response
to his
concerns that the draft language would make it harder to secure
interviews and
that
Dr Blix was likely to oppose it, Ambassador Negroponte had
said the arrangements
were
discretionary.
566.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that the French Mission had been pleased with
the
indications
of US movement, but were likely to suggest France should “push for
an
amendment
saying that the Council would convene immediately to ‘consider
any
measures’”.
He had warned Mr Levitte that there would be “a very big
reaction” if the
compromise
was rejected.
567.
Sir Jeremy
concluded that the new text had a “good chance of being a basis
for
progress so
long as the French are not foolish enough to reject it”. It was
clear the US
had “no
appetite to give more ground”.
180
Telegram
1983 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 16 October 2002, ‘Iraq: US
Compromises and
UK Intervention’.
303