6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
{{Preventing
interference in internal Iraqi affairs by outside states
(principally
Turkey and
Iran).
{{Providing a
credible promise of increasing Iraqi involvement in
administration
with a
road-map to Iraqi-led government, whilst ensuring no particular
group
feels
unduly disadvantaged.
“If any of
these conditions are not met, we must expect support rapidly to
evaporate
in all or
part of the country.
•
Clarity of
the Information Campaign message …
•
Legal
Position: in the
post-war period, irrespective of the status of UNSCRs,
the US/UK
forces in Iraq will be in ‘belligerent occupation’. This obliges
them to:
{{Restore
and maintain public order and safety by ‘respecting
the laws in force
… in the
occupied state’.
{{Assume
responsibility for administering the occupied area.
{{Take
responsibility for the medical care of inhabitants.
{{Supply
the civil population with food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding
and
shelter.
{{Facilitate
relief schemes, if required.
{{Facilitate the
operation of postal facilities, religious observance and
schools.
{{Issue a
proclamation making the existence, extent and special regulations
of
the
occupied territory clear to the inhabitants.
•
UK forces
are also obliged to apply the standards of the European
Convention
on Human
Rights, whereas US forces are not. This could present
complications
with
respect to the removal of detainees from Iraq, for
example.
•
These
responsibilities remain in force until the Occupation
ceases.
•
Expectations
that the Coalition forces will be able to deliver these
responsibilities
are high;
so if there is doubt over our ability to meet them in an
‘exemplary’
fashion we
should take steps to lower expectations as early as
possible.”
859.
The section of
the report on “Post-War Structures” stated that Iraq was “not
a
‘failed
state’”, nor was it recovering from a bloody civil war. The people
were “proud”
and would
“respond badly to condescension or perceived insults”.
860.
On law and
order and the judicial system, the Red Team judged
that:
“•
[O]nce an
assessment has been made of the effectiveness of local police
forces
it should
be increasingly possible to include them in military-led law and
order
operations”.
•
The Iraqi
judicial system was “largely dysfunctional” and an “interim
judicial
system may
be necessary”.
•
The prison
system was likely to need “a complete overhaul and
supervisory
regime”,
although the infrastructure might be “useable”.
467