6.3 |
Military equipment (pre-conflict)
199.
ACM Squire
wished to proceed with “not only those UORs classified
as
‘showstoppers’
but also those that will secure within an appropriate timescale
a
significant
enhancement to operational capability”.
200.
In response to
ACM Squire’s minute, Sir Kevin Tebbit wrote to Adm Boyce that
he
fully
understood “the difficulty of possible timelines for military
action, as long as the ban
on overt
preparations, including for UORs, has to remain in
place”.93
“I do not
think the political situation has yet evolved sufficiently to be
able to
recommend
to the Secretary of State that visible steps for contingency work
or
procurement
action can go forward.”
202.
Sir Kevin
concluded:
“I fear for
the time being that we are still in a position of preparing and
developing
our UOR
cases in readiness for detailed engagement with the Treasury, but
stopping
short of
visible measures, or indeed, implementation, pending the political
decision
from the
Secretary of State.”
203.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office wrote to Dr Cholerton on
17 September.94
Mr Hoon
was
content for
work to “proceed on some of the UORs” identified in Dr Cholerton’s
minute,
but “the
potential profile of the remainder would be problematic at the
present time”.
Mr Hoon
would, “however, be willing to accept further advice in due
course”. In the
meantime,
“no funds should be committed to Iraq-related UORs” until the
Treasury’s
agreement
was secured.
204.
An annex
stated that Mr Hoon was content for MOD officials to proceed
with
12 of Dr
Cholerton’s UORs, but the remaining four required further advice,
including
the desertisation
of armoured vehicles and ECBA.
205.
Mr Hoon
was content for the Centurion Group to be expanded as requested,
which
he
understood would be “an approximately 10 percent increase in the
community aware
of
contingency planning work”.
206.
On
18 September, Lt Gen Pigott circulated draft advice for
Mr Hoon on the UK’s
potential
contribution for discussion at an operational Chiefs of Staff
meeting the
following
day.95
He
stated:
“As
Secretary of State is aware six essential equipment measures
(Challenger II
desertisation,
fuel and water bowsers, enhanced combat body armour, SA80
and
93
Minute PUS
[MOD] to CDS, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq – UORs’.
94
Minute
APS/SofS [MOD] to Sec(O)1, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq – Urgent
Operational Requirements’.
95
Minute
Warrior CPT Leader [junior officer] to MA/CJO, 19 September
2002, ‘Warrior CPT – Update on
planning’
attaching Minute DCDS(C) to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], September
2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
contribution
to US-led action’.
31