The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
761.
Mr Watkins
explained that Mr Hoon and the Chiefs of Staff had therefore
agreed
that the UK
“should not actively seek this sort of wider role, but that we
should be
prepared to
consider any unsolicited US requests on their merits”.
762.
President
Bush and Mr Blair discussed Iraq on 5 March.
763.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet the following day that President Bush had agreed
that
the UN
should be “heavily involved” in post-conflict Iraq.
764.
There was
no clarification of what was meant by “heavily
involved”.
765.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed Iraq on 5 March.
766.
Mr Rycroft
advised Mr Blair that the key points he should make to
President Bush
included
that it was: “Crucial to have [a] UN role
post-conflict.”331
767.
Mr Blair
spoke to President Bush proposing further amendments to the
draft
resolution.
Mr Blair and President Bush also briefly discussed the
military plan.332
Mr Rycroft
informed the FCO that Mr Blair considered it important that
there was
a “UN badge”
for post-conflict work.
768.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 6 March that he had agreed with President Bush on
the
need for
the UN to be “heavily involved” in “the post-conflict situation, in
the event that
military
action was necessary”.333
769.
Points made in
discussion included that the reconstruction of Iraq would require
a
UN mandate,
not just UN involvement; otherwise the right of Coalition Forces to
engage
in
reconstruction work would be limited by their status as an
occupation force.
770.
Before
Mr Blair’s meeting on humanitarian and other post-conflict
issues
on 6 March,
the UK remained without an agreed approach to humanitarian
relief.
771.
On 5 March,
PJHQ warned the MOD that DFID had indicated that it
would
focus its
humanitarian effort on areas of Iraq with the greatest need and
not
necessarily
the UK’s AO.
772.
On 5 March,
PJHQ alerted the MOD to its concerns about provision
of
humanitarian
assistance in a UK AO in the immediate aftermath of
conflict.334
PJHQ
advised
that it had planned to “piggy-back” on US arrangements, but it was
now
apparent
that the US plan depended heavily on the provision of funding to
international
organisations
(IOs) and NGOs. Those organisations were unlikely to be present in
the
331
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 5 March 2003, ‘Bush Call’.
332
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 5 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 5 March’.
333
Cabinet
Conclusions, 6 March 2003.
334
Minute PJHQ
[junior official] to MOD Sec(O) 4, 5 March 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
resourcing of humanitarian
assistance’.
448