The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
211.
Mr Blair
emphasised that the UN route had been chosen “very
deliberately”
because it
was “important” that Saddam Hussein was “disarmed with the support
of
the
international community”. He hoped that the House would unite
around the position
that if the
UN resolution was breached, “action must follow, because the UN
mandate
has to be
upheld”. The Government’s position was that a “second UN
resolution” was
“preferable”,
but it had:
“… also
said that there are circumstances in which a UN resolution is not
necessary,
because it
is necessary to be able to say in circumstances where an
unreasonable
veto is put
down that we would still act.”80
212.
In his
evidence to the Liaison Committee on 21 January, Mr Blair was
asked about
the impact
of taking action without a second resolution.81
213.
In his
responses, Mr Blair emphasised a second resolution would be
highly
desirable,
but argued that action should not be “unreasonably
blocked”.
•
It would be
“easier in every respect” if there was a second resolution,
but
there could
not be “a situation where there is a material breach recognised
by
everybody
and yet action is unreasonably blocked”. Without that
“qualification”,
the
discussion in the Security Council was “not likely to be as
productive as it
should
be”.
•
It would be
“highly desirable” to have a second resolution.
•
It would be
“more difficult” to act without one, but if the inspectors said
that they
could not
do their job properly or they made a finding that there were
weapons
of mass
destruction, it would “be wrong” in the face of a veto “if we said
‘Right,
well there
is nothing we can do, he can carry on and develop these
weapons.’
… We must
not give a signal to Saddam that there is a way out of this … [It]
is
best done
with the maximum international support but it will not be done at
all
if Saddam
thinks there is any weakness …” That “would be
disastrous”.
214.
Lord Goldsmith
was asked by the Inquiry about the timing and substance of
his
advice to
Mr Blair on the impact of a veto.82
215.
Lord Goldsmith
wrote:
“… I do not
think that there was any doubt about my view. I had been clear at
the
meeting
with the Prime Minister on 22 October 2002, and I provided a
written record
of my view
in David Brummell’s letter of 23 October 2002. Although I said I
would
consider
the issue further, the sense that I conveyed was that I would look
at the
issue again
to see if anything changed my mind. To that end, I did have a
discussion
80
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 15
January 2003, column 678.
81
Minutes 21
January 2003, Liaison Committee (House of Commons), [Minutes of
Evidence], Q&A 25,
27‑28, 52,
54.
82
Statement,
17 January 2011, paragraphs 4.1-4.7.
44