The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
tolerable
but my point is that nothing changed on 19 September and we
should not
therefore
assume that the existing strategy for police SSR is wholly
off‑track or
now
inappropriate, nor should it overshadow the excellent work being
done at the
tactical level.”
960.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry Lt Gen Dutton said that the military
was “certainly
aware” of
the reputation of Jameat police station, but:
“… did it
come as a surprise? Yes, because … it was an event that was
triggered
by
individuals getting themselves into a fire fight and then being
taken to that police
station. So
… it is not as if the Jameat police station incident … evolved from
a
series of
other events; it was a particular thing that caused it. So it was
certainly a
961.
Lt
Gen Dutton said that the incident had “huge effect” in London
and at PJHQ
but that
“it calmed down quite quickly”. With hindsight, Lt Gen Dutton
said that “there
perhaps
wasn’t as much upwards communication to Baghdad, to keep them in
the
picture, as
would have been useful”.
962.
Lt
Gen Riley told the Inquiry that, although the Jameat incident
occurred after he
had left
Iraq, he “would not have expected it”.900
Explaining
how it arose, he said:
“The Iraqi
police in the South … reflected the local political climate and the
tensions,
and all the
tensions that were present in southern Iraqi society played out in
the
police
…”
963.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lieutenent General John Cooper, GOC
MND(SE)
from
December 2005 to July 2006, referred to the fall‑out with the Basra
Provincial
Council as
“the divorce”.901
He said
that the restricted access to Basra’s police stations
that
followed enabled “a series of murder squads and corruption to
become endemic”
and
“produced a climate of lawlessness” inside Basra’s police. Lt
Gen Cooper told
the Inquiry:
“… because
we were not allowed to go back into contact until May of 2006, it
meant
that we
lost ground and we lost time.”
964.
Lt
Gen Cooper added that “some policemen would still allow us in,
but the vast
majority
were following the Provincial Council direction that they weren’t
to have
anything to
do with us”.902
He said
that the Council only re‑engaged when a “major
security
incident” occurred after a Lynx helicopter was shot down in May
2006.
965.
Lieutenent
General Sir Richard Shirreff, GOC MND(SE) from July 2006
until
January
2007, also told the Inquiry about restrictions on visiting Basra’s
police stations.
899
Public
hearing, 12 July 2010, pages 36‑38.
900
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, page 12.
901
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 20‑21.
902
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 49‑50.
276