3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
220.
The British
Embassy Moscow reported on 13 February that, during the visit
to
France,
President Putin had said “so far we see no need to exercise our
right of veto”;
and it was
also reported that he had then said that “with France or alone”,
Russia would
veto an
“unreasonable use of force”.60
He had
described the tripartite declaration as
“the first
attempt since the Second World War to settle a serious and acute
international
issue
outside the regime of blocs”; and “if we want the world to be more
predictable, and
easier to
forecast, and therefore a safer place, it should be a multipolar
world”.
221.
The Embassy
also reported that, referring to the veto in a subsequent
conversation
with
journalists in Bordeaux, President Putin had said: “We have used
this right more
than once,
and we can do it again.” He had also warned against “fuelling
controversy
over this
issue”, and stressed that “Russia will never return to the state of
conflict with
its partners
either in Europe or North America.”
222.
The Embassy
commented that President Putin’s remarks in France had “had
a
harder edge
to them. But this is probably in part a negotiating tactic in
advance of the
series of
key events … over the next few days; and in part a desire to please
his host.”
The French
Embassy in Moscow continued to “believe that Russia would not
veto”
a second
resolution.
223.
After
consultations in New York on 10 February, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
reported
that the US priority was to “pour cold water” on the tripartite
proposals.
224.
The US was
“very hesitant” about the UK’s ideas for an ultimatum.
225.
Following
discussions in New York on 10 February, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
reported
that the US had agreed there should be no action in the Security
Council
until after
14 February; the immediate priority was “to pour cold water on the
latest
226.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that France had written to Dr Blix to expand its
ideas
for
strengthening the inspection regime, drawing on the tripartite
declaration, but had
declined to
share the text until Dr Blix had responded.
227.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that the US was “still very hesitant about
any
variant of
the ultimatum”, because it would give the Security Council a second
chance
to consider
whether the ultimatum had been implemented. By putting the onus on
the
reports of
the inspectors, it could also give them an effective veto. Sir
Jeremy had
informed
Ambassador Negroponte that the UK needed “a second stage of
Council
action
beyond 1441, and a determination, even implicit, of material
breach. After further
60
Telegram 53
Moscow to FCO London, 13 February 2003, ‘Putin in France and DUMA
Activity’.
61
Telegram
236 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 10
February Bilaterals’.
221