9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
Ambassador
Bremer wrote that at the end of April the US Marines sought to
resolve the
security
situation in Fallujah through the formation of the “Fallujah
Brigade”.527
This
group
would
“police the city” provided that US troops agreed to
withdraw:
“The key
assumption was that this Iraqi brigade of about 3,000 would
accomplish our
objectives
for the city by capturing or killing the insurgents and the foreign
fighters.”
Ambassador
Bremer, Dr Rice and Generals Abizaid and Sanchez had not been
made
aware of
the Brigade’s creation in advance.
General
Jassim Mohammed Saleh, a former member of the Republican Guard, had
been
appointed
to head the Brigade.528
Shia
leaders quickly denounced this action, complaining
that the US
was re-establishing the Saddam Hussein-era army.
Two days
later, General Saleh was replaced by General Mohammed
Latif.529
The JIC
assessed in May that General Saleh nonetheless remained in control
of the
The Iraqi
National Security Council reacted angrily. Mr Ali Allawi, the
Defence Minister,
warned of
the risk of a “severe backlash amongst the Shia”, while another
moderate Shia
member of
GC added that the brigade was “a move to Iraqi disunity and civil
war”.531
958.
On 28 April,
in an update on Iraq, the JIC assessed that:
“Elements
from the Mahdi Army are still conducting attacks across central
and
southern
Iraq, although at a much reduced level … Some reporting
indicates
MAS
[Muqtada al-Sadr] is losing support, with militants drifting away
and local
people
increasingly resentful. There are also reports that the Badr Corps
may be …
strengthen[ing]
their presence in some key Shia areas and religious sites.
This
situation
may lead to intra-Shia clashes …
“ … a hard
core of the Mahdi Army may be concentrating on the defence of
Najaf
and the
nearby town of Kufah … A significant presence also remains in
Karbala.
This hard
core may be prepared to resist any attempt to seize al-Sadr in the
event of
negotiations
failing …
“The talks
with al-Sadr in Najaf continue, but progress is slow. He appears to
be
increasingly
isolated and senior Shia figures continue to distance
themselves.
The key
issues remain the indictment against al-Sadr and the future of the
Mahdi
Army …
There are … splits in his movement between hard-liners advocating
further
527
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
528 Allawi
AA. The
Occupation of Iraq: winning the war, losing the
peace. Yale
University Press, 2007.
529
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
530
JIC
Assessment, 20 May 2004, ‘Iraq Update’.
531
Bremer LP
III & McConnell M. My Year in
Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.
Threshold,
2006.
363