The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
664.
Mr Blair
concluded: “In parallel we should of course maintain our rhetoric
and step
up military
preparations.”
665.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the Note was “a very well made, carefully
constructed
argument
that made sense”, and that President Bush had read it before the
telephone
666.
Sir David
Manning spoke to Dr Rice about the Note.224
He reported
that it was clear
that the
White House had a different perspective about the advantages of
moving to
military
action as soon as possible and the importance of a second
resolution, including
for
securing support from Arab governments.
667.
In his
subsequent conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair pursued
the
proposals
in his Note and explained his political difficulties.
668.
When
Mr Blair spoke to President Bush later that day, he set out
the strategy
in his Note
and his view on the dilemma they faced.225
The
international community
was “not
yet ready” for a second resolution, but an operation without one
would be
“much
tougher”.
669.
Mr Blair
said that it was possible that the inspectors would find a smoking
gun,
but he was
“not relying on that”. In his view, even if there were no smoking
gun and the
Iraqis were
giving the inspectors access, Dr Blix:
“… would
say that they were not co‑operating sufficiently. Saddam had to
co‑operate
actively
with identifying and destroying all his WMD … So in our view Saddam
was
already in
breach of 1441. But the international community was in denial. Our
case
would
strengthen if there were a series of Blix reports that Iraq was not
co‑operating.
We needed
to give the inspectors more time to firm up the case.”
670.
Mr Blair
proposed setting a clear deadline. Unless there were full
co‑operation
by then,
we would seek a second resolution: “If this were not achievable,
military action
would
follow anyway.” Military preparations and diplomatic work to build
international
support
should continue.
671.
Later
Mr Blair argued that “we needed to look reasonable” and that
the deadline
for the
start of military action should be delayed to the end of
March.
672.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had been clear that there was no
international
political
support “without Blix finding a smoking gun and we needed more
time”.
The inspectors
should be given another month. Mr Blair was “sure that in time
we could
turn
opinion”. President Bush was “pretty clear there would have to be
war, because
223
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
224
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 24 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Your
Conversation with Bush’.
225
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with President Bush,
24
January’.
118